The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
Sociology and Fairness¶
Who will really choose B, what happens to inequality, age and vulnerable groups. General rules of the base — in the introduction.
How to read this chapter (note of 02.10.2026). The text contains wording that is easy to misread: sums and formulas with coefficients are worked examples: the size of the payment is set as a percentage of the median income approved by referendum; "a x2 vote", "x3", "the weight of a vote" are the arithmetic of a share, not a multiplier: every ballot counts as one; a "reversible" choice means "at the next election": within one election exit is final. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.
Q-SOC-001 · This is a tax on the poor: the poor will sell their vote, the rich will keep their influence¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: left-wing critics, sociologists — the second most frequent objection Source in the book: §29.5 Related: Q-ETH-003, Q-ETH-004, Q-ELE-004
Answer. Structurally the A/B choice is identical for everyone regardless of income — there is no discrimination in the mechanism. Empirically the poor are indeed more likely to take the dividend, but that means AB-EXIT gives them real money rather than deceiving them. The converse holds too: a poor person who wants influence can refuse and vote with strengthened weight. A rich person who cannot be bothered will take the payment.
Weak point of the answer. The answer removes the charge of discrimination but not the question of the resulting composition of the electorate. If 1.5 % of the median means a lot to the poor and nothing to the rich, then "the same option" is the same legally and not the same in the strength of the incentive. This is acknowledged; the counter-argument is that the sum is deliberately small for exactly that reason.
Q-SOC-002 · Who will actually choose B — is there a profile?¶
Status: 🟡 open Who asks: sociologists, campaigns, researchers Source in the book: §16 "Age economics", §17, §27 Related: Q-ELE-001, Q-ELE-003
Answer. The book gives outlines (age dynamics, the division into pragmatists and ideologues, the disappearing class of working men), but there is no predictive profile of who chooses B. There are simulations that model behaviour under different assumptions.
Weak point of the answer. The absence of a profile is the hole through which half the criticism enters (Q-ELE-002, Q-ELE-003, Q-SOC-001). Without it any claim about consequences rests on "we assume". A priority section for development.
Q-SOC-003 · What stops an employer or a party from pressing a person's choice?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: trade unions, human-rights advocates Source in the book: §4 "Basic principles" — the anti-coercion principle Related: Q-IMP-002, Q-SOC-005
Answer. Any attempt by a party, an employer or a third party to influence a citizen's choice is a criminal offence by the protocol's construction. This is one of the six basic principles, not an addendum.
Weak point of the answer. Criminalisation is an answer on paper. Coercion to vote is criminalised practically everywhere and nevertheless exists. The difference with AB-EXIT is that the choice of B is recorded in a register, that is, becomes verifiable — and therefore potentially observable by whoever applies the pressure. Privacy of the choice and protection from pressure are in direct contradiction here, and it is unresolved. See Q-IMP-002.
Q-SOC-004 · Won't it create two sorts of citizens — the "takers" and the "voters"?¶
Status: 🟡 open Who asks: sociologists, commentators Source in the book: indirectly §5 "The fifth class" Related: Q-ETH-002, Q-SOC-003
Answer. Formally no: all rights other than voting in this cycle are preserved, and the status is reversible every four years. But the book has no social examination of stigmatisation ("he's one of those who sold out").
Weak point of the answer. Legal equality does not protect against social stratification. If the choice of B becomes a publicly visible marker, exactly the division the protocol avoids at the level of law will arise. Linked to the problem of register privacy — Q-IMP-002. A section is needed.
Q-SOC-005 · A family where one wants to take the money and the other to vote: conflict, loophole, or "kitchen terrorism"?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: sociologists, journalists, family lawyers; in the Gemini audit formulated as "household conflicts" (039b.3.3) Source in the book: 19e.5b, 039b.3.3, 015b.2 Related: Q-SOC-003, Q-IMP-002
Answer. The protocol does not see the family: two buttons per citizen, the dividend personal, to the recipient's account. So a family of two adults can hold both states at once — one takes D, the other votes — and at an exit of half the electorate or more one remaining vote weighs no less than two of today's: the family loses nothing in influence and gets D on top. The argument "money or vote" does not face the family; only "who carries what this cycle" does, and that is its own business, like the second shift. Not a loophole: each vote still costs one D. The case of the domestic tyrant — compare with today: family voting (he votes for her) is recorded by OSCE observers now; after the protocol, if she is in B, he has no ballot of hers, and if he keeps her in A, the second vote costs the family D for the first time; his own weight is that of any remaining voter. He can take her D as he takes her wages today, but now with a bank record.
Weak point of the answer. "No losses" holds at an exit of half or more; at a small exit the trade "half a vote for D" is real — the protocol's normal price, not a flaw, but "no losses" can be promised only for the first cycles. A tyrant can take her D: the protocol is not a family code, and a bank record helps only where courts work. The size of the phenomenon in the target countries: Moldova 2025 — 1 % of observations, Albania 2025 — 11 %; for the EU and US the measured pressure is the employer's, not the family's (048h.4). The reading of the architect's formulation "Yin-Yang. The balance of family life" belongs to the assistant.
Q-SOC-006 · Strauss and Howe: crises come every 80 years by the laws of the saeculum. Won't the protocol fail to cancel that?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: readers of The Fourth Turning, futurologists Source in the book: 040k "Strauss and Howe" Related: Q-SOC-007, Q-META-003
Answer. The saeculum has one engine: institutions lose feedback and are repaired only by collapse, because there is no continuous channel of correction. The protocol puts correction into every cycle — the number on the account, the exit share, the weight of the vote — and the Crisis as a reset mechanism ceases to be needed. Their theory is true the way medicine before penicillin was true. What remains of it is a calendar for one use — the Crisis window to enter the door — and a vocabulary. All five arguments they would raise turned out to be descriptions of the world without a thermostat.
Weak point of the answer. The weakness of the world after is not the return of the saeculum but resistance: pathologies that did not exist before the cure — substitution of the median's source, corruption of the register, the wording of the question. They can be tested only in that world.
Q-SOC-007 · Fukuyama: people revolt against liberal democracy out of boredom and a thirst for recognition. Won't money fail to lead them away?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: political scientists, readers of The End of History Source in the book: 040l "Fukuyama", 013f Related: Q-SOC-006, Q-ELE-002
Answer. His "last man" is our apathetic and our burned: boredom from a weightless vote, not from satiety. The "sated bored rebel" falls apart: a populist always threatens the well-off — by a tax, a levy or a contract to a crony — so they have a stake; the truly bored are below one per cent; between money and a free gesture most take the money; and whoever stayed has already shown himself. Fukuyama's blind spot: he idealised the form, universal equal suffrage, and so looked for breakdowns anywhere but in the voter; he had no defence against the free mass in any of his books.
Weak point of the answer. The 2026 position is assembled from reviews and the open parts of the memoir; if its closed part contains a reform proposal of his own, the comparison must be redone.
Q-SOC-008 · The "lying-flat generation" has refused to work and to have children. Who created this, and what does the protocol change?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: sociologists, employers, demographers Source in the book: 019g "The Second Wave of Exit", 016 §25 Related: Q-SOC-004, Q-SOC-007, Q-ECO-003
Answer. It was created by policy for a stakeless majority: school, press, budget and regulation aim at the middle, creators are not needed — the middle envies them, the ruler fears them, the official cannot be bothered — and suppressing them with prohibitions costs nothing, because "the apathetic have no café". The calculation "the creators will carry everyone" is written into budgets and has failed: first the active left the elections, now they leave the economy. Checked against data: the median German voter is 52, the top tenth pays 60–70 % of income tax, school reforms lift the middle and drop the strong, 21 % of the employed are engaged. The protocol leads the free mass out, the number on the account rates stagnation, the electorate grows younger by itself, and being clever begins to pay.
Weak point of the answer. The share of non-political causes — automation and world competition — is not estimated, and without it one cannot say what part of the generation the protocol will bring back.