The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.

The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.

36. Comparative Analysis of 10 Similar Ideas of the Last 20 Years: What Delivers Results¶

Chapter: 07 File version: v1 Date: 2026-06-11 Source: v6.53 §85

How to read this chapter (note of 02.10.2026). The text contains wording that is easy to misread: sums and formulas with coefficients are worked examples: the size of the payment is set as a percentage of the median income approved by referendum; "a x2 vote", "x3", "the weight of a vote" are the arithmetic of a share, not a multiplier: every ballot counts as one; a blockchain is one implementation option: the charter requires only open code. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.

85.1. Purpose of the section¶

This section studies 10 ideas that appeared over the last 20 years (2005–2026) and fall into the category "reforms of democratic mechanics with a possible economic element". The goal is not to describe the ideas but to extract stable patterns of success and failure, so that AB-EXIT can rely on the empirical experience of its predecessors rather than be built from scratch.

The section also records one specific observation: AB-EXIT surpasses the nearest ideologically related idea (Plurality / quadratic voting) in clarity of communication and in having a ready implementation mechanism.

85.2. Ten ideas with analysis¶

1. Ranked Choice Voting (RCV). Adopted in San Francisco in 2002 (first used in 2004), in Maine 2016 (by initiative), in Alaska 2020. By 2026 — three states use RCV at state level (Alaska, Maine, in part Hawaii), and individual cities in thirteen more states; 19 states have banned it by law (Ballotpedia, March 2026; corrected 01.10.2026 — it previously read "7 states have RCV"). What worked: a centralised advocacy organisation, FairVote, with 30+ years of expertise, the strategy "local pilots → states", anchor donors, an anti-party narrative. What did not: partisan blocking in red states, the difficulty of explaining the mechanics to an ordinary voter. Lesson for AB-EXIT: local pilots create empirical proof before a state-level launch.

2. UBI / Yang's Freedom Dividend. Yang launched a campaign in 2017 around $1,000/month. Personally paid several families from campaign funds in 2019. By 2026 — UBI not adopted at the federal level, but pilots in dozens of cities (Stockton first). What worked: a bright simple message, a candidate-evangelist as the face of the idea, empirical demonstration through real payments, cross-party appeal. What did not: the lack of a realistic fiscal model for scaling; the idea got stuck at the local level. Lesson for AB-EXIT: a human face makes an idea recognisable, but without a fiscal model it stays local.

3. Citizens' Assemblies / Sortition. Ireland 2012–18 (the abortion referendum via an assembly, a success), France 2019–20 (the climate convention). By 2026 — dozens of assemblies worldwide. What worked: the bingo signal "ordinary people can", parliamentary approval in Ireland, concrete cases with measurable results. What did not: assemblies give recommendations, have no legislative force; parliament can gut them (Macron with the French proposals). Lesson for AB-EXIT: partnership with parliament gives legitimacy, but if parliament keeps the last word, the idea is easily diluted. This is an argument for citizen initiative (Route A, section 68).

4. Quadratic Voting / Plurality (RadicalxChange, Glen Weyl). The book Radical Markets 2018, the RxC Foundation 2018, use in the Colorado House 2019 and Gitcoin Grants. By 2026 — academically known, no governmental adoption. What worked: intellectual elegance attracted Buterin, Tang, the academic circles of Microsoft Research, Harvard, MIT; the open-source book Plurality (2024) spread free of charge; a strong theoretical base. What did not: the concept is too complex for the broad public, "quadratic" requires explaining mathematics, no bright message, use remained in niche contexts. Lesson for AB-EXIT: intellectual elegance ≠ public success.

5. Top-Two / Top-Four Primaries. California 2010 (Prop 14), Washington 2008, Alaska 2020 (with RCV). By 2026 — works in 3 states. What worked: alliance with anti-partisan movements, the promise to reduce extremism, empirical support after adoption (Mary Peltola, Lisa Murkowski in Alaska). What did not: parties actively block — it is an attack on their primary monopoly. Lesson for AB-EXIT: an attack on party monopoly works through direct elections. AB-EXIT goes further — it attacks the mobilisation base of both parties (the apathetic) economically.

6. Independent Redistricting Commissions. California 2008 and 2010 (Props 11 and 20), Michigan 2018, Colorado 2018. By 2026 — nine states with independent commissions for congressional and legislative districts. Two counter-examples: in Utah the commission adopted by voters in 2018 was reduced by the legislature to an advisory one; in Ohio a citizens' commission was defeated at the 2024 referendum, 53.7 % against (corrected 01.10.2026 — both states previously stood in the list of successes, and the number was "about 12"). What worked: a clear anti-corruption narrative, partisan balance (both parties could be victims), anchor donors (Chan-Zuckerberg, Hewlett), submission via ballot initiative as a bypass of parliament. What did not: party resistance in red states. Lesson for AB-EXIT: the structure "bypass parliament via ballot initiative" works (our Route A). An anti-corruption narrative attracts all sides.

7. Vote-by-Mail. Oregon 1998, Colorado 2013, Washington 2011, expansion after COVID-19. By 2026 — 8 states with universal mail-in; restrictions introduced in red states. What worked: COVID-19 as a catalyst, existing models (Oregon), active Democratic promotion. What did not: partisan polarisation after 2020 (the Trump-MAGA narrative about fraud). Lesson for AB-EXIT: a reform can become a partisan battle; it is important to avoid association with one party. AB-EXIT via the narrative "money for everyone" is structurally harder to partisanise.

8. State-level UBI Experiments. Stockton SEED 2019 ($500/month × 125 residents × 2 years), the Mayors for a Guaranteed Income coalition 2020. By 2026 — 100+ cities in the USA. What worked: Stockton's empirical results (published 2021), the mayor-to-mayor network, association with Yang's UBI. What did not: the pilots remained pilots, funding private, scaling to a state UBI did not happen. Lesson for AB-EXIT: local pilots with empirical data are a strong legitimation tool.

9. Worldcoin (Sam Altman). Launch 2021, open launch July 2023. By 2026 — tens of millions of users, but regulatory problems (Kenya, Hong Kong, Europe). What worked: Altman's venture funding ($240M+), global spread, the link to the AI narrative. What did not: privacy problems (biometrics as a mandatory condition), regulatory bans, perception as "a billionaires' technological utopia". Lesson for AB-EXIT: avoid association with biometrics and the control of one corporation. AB-EXIT through citizen initiative and state administration is more legitimate. Minimising technology in the public description (section 78.10) is the right direction.

10. Liquid Democracy (Pirate Party Germany). The LiquidFeedback platform since 2010, 8.9 % in Berlin 2011. By 2026 — the Pirate Party has practically disappeared, the tool remained an academic concept. What worked: intellectual appeal, transparency, a working technology. What did not: no scaling happened, difficulty of explanation, technical problems of the platform. Lesson for AB-EXIT: idea + technology is not enough. An emotional face, a simple message, an anchor political partner are needed.

85.3. What works (common patterns of successful ideas)¶

First: a simple memorable 5-second message. RCV: "rank the candidates". UBI: "$1,000 to everyone". Top-Two: "the two best go through". The more complex the explanation, the worse the result. AB-EXIT: "money or a strengthened vote" — works.

Second: local pilots before big victories. RCV — cities first, then states. UBI — Stockton, then other cities. Anti-gerrymandering — one state at a time. Without local proof an idea remains theory.

Third: an anchor donor + a mass base. All successful reforms had an anchor donor (Action Now Initiative, Chan-Zuckerberg, Dorsey). A pure grassroots campaign without money does not work. A purely donor campaign without a local base does not work either.

Fourth: bypassing parliament via ballot initiative. Every successful reform of the last 20 years passed through direct democracy, not through legislation. The parliamentary path is blocked almost always. Validates Route A (section 68).

Fifth: empirical verification after the first adoption. RCV in Maine → data → spread. Stockton SEED → published results → spread. Without measurable data after a pilot the idea does not scale.

Sixth: a cross-partisan narrative. Anti-gerrymandering worked because it hit both parties. AB-EXIT via section 80.7 (works for all three camps) does this structurally.

85.4. What does not work (common patterns of failure)¶

— Dependence on one political party (Vote-by-mail became "Democratic" — a ceiling on support). — Complex technical concepts without a simple explanation (Quadratic Voting, Liquid Democracy). — Control by one actor (Worldcoin as Altman's project). — Absence of a first real adoption (Liquid Democracy outside the Pirate Party).

Review of 01.10.2026. Sections 85.5 and 85.7 are the June 2026 wording, before the charter decisions (048k), the Australian check (023c) and the analysis of Arizona (023f). Re-read with the same rigour; what holds and what does not is in 85.8. The text below is kept as it stands.

85.5. AB-EXIT vs the whole class of reforms — structural superiority in the combination of parameters¶

Comparing AB-EXIT with one idea taken separately (for example, Plurality) shows superiority in several respects. But a more precise analysis shows that AB-EXIT surpasses the WHOLE class of studied reforms in a unique combination of parameters that none of the ten ideas of section 85.2 has.

Five parameters by which the ideas are compared:

Clarity of message — can the essence be explained in 5 seconds without special knowledge?
Material incentive for the voter — is there a direct personal benefit from adoption?
A ready implementation mechanism — is there a proven path from idea to real adoption?
Universal applicability — does the idea work in different types of political systems?
Complementarity with other reforms — does the idea reinforce other reforms or compete with them?

Comparison matrix by these parameters:

— RCV. Clarity: medium (ranking must be explained). Material incentive: none. Mechanism: ballot initiative works in states with the right of initiative. Universality: medium (mainly English-speaking systems). Complementarity: competes with plurality voting.

— UBI / Freedom Dividend. Clarity: high. Material incentive: high (direct payments). Mechanism: absent (Yang lost the primaries on the question "where's the money from"). Universality: high in principle, but unrealised without a mechanism. Complementarity: neutral.

— Citizens' Assemblies. Clarity: low (requires explaining deliberative democracy). Material incentive: none. Mechanism: parliamentary, but parliament can gut it. Universality: high in developed democracies. Complementarity: high.

— Quadratic Voting / Plurality. Clarity: low (requires explaining mathematics). Material incentive: none. Mechanism: absent after 8 years of public activity. Universality: medium. Complementarity: high, but theoretical without a mechanism.

— Top-Two Primaries. Clarity: medium. Material incentive: none. Mechanism: ballot initiative works. Universality: low (the specifics of the American two-party system). Complementarity: complements RCV.

— Independent Redistricting. Clarity: high (anti-corruption narrative). Material incentive: none. Mechanism: ballot initiative works. Universality: low (the specifics of American districts). Complementarity: neutral.

— Vote-by-Mail. Clarity: high. Material incentive: none. Mechanism: legislative, but partisanised. Universality: high. Complementarity: neutral.

— State-level UBI Experiments. Clarity: high. Material incentive: high locally. Mechanism: pilots via mayors, no scaling. Universality: medium. Complementarity: with a federal UBI.

— Worldcoin. Clarity: medium. Material incentive: present but small. Mechanism: corporate, regulatorily problematic. Universality: global, but banned in a number of countries. Complementarity: none (control by one corporation).

— Liquid Democracy. Clarity: low. Material incentive: none. Mechanism: absent after 15+ years. Universality: theoretical. Complementarity: none (requires full replacement of the electoral system).

Where AB-EXIT stands on all five parameters:

Clarity of message: high. "Money or a strengthened vote, you choose" — 5 seconds without special knowledge.
Material incentive: high. Direct payments tied to the local economy (about 300 dollars on world average). The incentive works for the whole electorate, not only the poor strata.
A ready implementation mechanism: TWO routes. Route A via citizen-initiated statute (section 68, the ready Oregon-2028 plan). Route B via parliamentary scandal + private referendum (section 84, ready for most of the world).
Universal applicability: global. Works in the USA, Switzerland, Italy via Route A. Works in Poland, Hungary, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan via Route B. Works even in semi-authoritarian systems.
Complementarity: high. AB-EXIT works at a level above other reforms (section 82). First it removes the apathetic, creating an electorate capable of quality deliberation. Then the tools of Plurality (quadratic voting, Polis), RCV, Citizens' Assemblies work more effectively.

Structural superiority:

Not one of the ten studied ideas has ALL five parameters at a high level simultaneously. Every successful reform (RCV, Independent Redistricting) is implemented but has one or two weak parameters, because of which it spreads slowly. Every intellectually elegant reform (Plurality, Liquid Democracy) has strong theoretical parameters but a critically weak implementation mechanism.

AB-EXIT is the only reform in the studied class that has a high rating on all five parameters at once. This is not self-praise — it is an operational fact that can be checked through the same comparative analysis.

And it is important to stress: not one of the ten studied ideas even approaches such a combination. Those that are implemented (RCV, Independent Redistricting, Vote-by-Mail, State UBI Experiments) are implemented partially, slowly, or have been partisanised. Those that are intellectually elegant (Plurality, Liquid Democracy) have no mechanism. Those that are popular as an idea (Freedom Dividend) have no path.

AB-EXIT combines intellectual elegance with a ready implementation mechanism through a referendum — a unique combination that none of the projects of the last 20 years had, even those that were implemented.

What this means practically:

It means that AB-EXIT is in a structurally more advantageous position than any of the ten studied reforms at the moment of their launch. The creators of RCV in 2004 did not have a model plus ready implementation routes plus a clear message plus a material incentive plus complementarity — they had only one or two of these qualities. The same for all the rest.

AB-EXIT in 2026 starts with a fuller set than any of these ideas. This is not a guarantee of success — there are no guarantees. But it is the best starting position for a reform of democratic mechanics in the last 20 years.

This fact is worth recording as an operational observation, without exaggeration. The comparative analysis confirms it empirically.

85.6. Application to AB-EXIT — five concrete consequences¶

First — a local pilot before Oregon 2028. The best strategy is not the state at once but first a small town with an active civic council. Possible candidates: Benton County in Oregon (an RCV pioneer), one of the towns in Maine or Colorado. Empirical success in one town makes Oregon 2028 10 times more likely.

Second — an emotional face of the idea (section 70, portrait of the bearer). Yang made UBI recognisable through himself. Weyl made Plurality through himself. Without a public bearer AB-EXIT will stay at the level of Liquid Democracy.

Third — an anchor donor found BEFORE the first ballot initiative. Not "after success" but "before launch". This is the work of the next 6–12 months. Candidates — see the map of champions from earlier discussion (Bridgewater via Dalio, Dorsey, Hoffman, Andreessen, Cuban).

Fourth — cross-partisan positioning is already built in (section 80.7); it must be used consistently. Not "a progressive reform", not "a libertarian idea", but "a reform for all three camps at once".

Fifth — the simple 5-second message already exists ("money or a strengthened vote"); do not complicate it. All the technical depth is in the repo for those interested. On the site, in the PDF, in the pitch — a simple phrase.

These five consequences are not theoretical but empirically derived from the analysis of 10 real ideas of the last 20 years.

85.7. The irreversibility of AB-EXIT as a sixth comparison parameter¶

In comparing AB-EXIT with the ten reforms by five parameters (section 85.5) one critically important sixth parameter was omitted: irreversibility. This parameter determines WHETHER the reform will TAKE HOLD after adoption, or be constantly subjected to rollbacks.

Empirical data from the studied reforms show that most of them are under constant threat of rollback or are already being rolled back:

— RCV: implemented in 7 states but banned by law in 19 states. Trump-MAGA supporters actively work on rollback in the states of adoption. — Vote-by-Mail: expanded massively after COVID-19, but many red states passed laws restricting mail-in voting after 2020. — Independent Redistricting Commissions: in several states parties are working to dissolve them. — State-level UBI Experiments: funded by private donors, close when the funding ends. — Citizens' Assemblies: parliament guts the recommendations (the French climate example). — Worldcoin: banned by a single regulatory act in a country. — Liquid Democracy: disappeared with the decline of the Pirate Party.

That is, most reforms of the last 20 years are under constant threat of rollback; many are already being rolled back.

AB-EXIT is structurally irreversible for five reasons:

First — a mass class of dividend recipients. After the first cycle a group of tens or hundreds of millions of people receiving direct payments forms. Any attempt to abolish AB-EXIT means taking their money from this mass. In politics there is not a single precedent of a state successfully abolishing a mass payment to citizens accustomed to receiving it.

Second — the remaining electorate is structurally stronger. Pragmatists and Ideologues with tripled vote weight are able to analyse and resist rollback attempts. This is not an apathetic electorate manipulated by populism but a conscious electorate defending its new opportunities.

Third — benefit for business. AB-EXIT creates a coalition of citizens and honest business (section 80.7). Business after AB-EXIT works in a more transparent environment. Abolishing AB-EXIT returns business to a corrupt system. Honest business becomes a natural ally of preserving AB-EXIT.

Fourth — measurable economic improvements. After the first cycle measurable improvements appear: growth of the median wage (and therefore of the dividend), a fall in corruption, growth of long-term investment. These improvements become the argument "roll back = lose the achievements". Norway shows that a transparent accountable system creates a reinforcement loop.

Fifth — the formula is fixed in a smart contract via citizen initiative. Section 73 (protection from the poison pill) and section 78 (technical architecture) show that changing the formula requires a new referendum. Parliament cannot abolish AB-EXIT through a by-law. This is structural protection against quiet erosion.

A sixth reinforcement — the international demonstration effect. If AB-EXIT is implemented in one country and works, other countries will want it. Rollback becomes an international reputational catastrophe.

Comparison with historical precedents of the irreversibility of mass payments:

History has rare examples of reforms that after first adoption proved practically irreversible:

— Social Security in the USA (1935): after 90 years of existence nobody seriously proposes abolishing it, despite structural problems. Too many recipients. — Medicare in the USA (1965): the same. — FDIC deposit insurance (1933): built into the financial infrastructure. — The NHS in the United Kingdom (1948): any party that seriously tries to abolish it loses the election. — The GI Bill (1944): after adoption became politically untouchable.

What do these reforms have in common? All created mass groups of recipients with a direct material benefit. Once the recipients formed, any attempt at abolition becomes political suicide.

AB-EXIT falls into this category. After the first cycle of implementation it becomes as untouchable as Social Security or the NHS. This is not theoretical durability; it is the empirically tested pattern of the irreversibility of mass payments.

The structural significance of the sixth parameter:

All the other five parameters (clarity, material incentive, mechanism, universality, complementarity) determine WHETHER the reform will REACH adoption. The sixth parameter — irreversibility — determines WHETHER it will TAKE HOLD after adoption.

Many reforms pass the first barrier but not the second. AB-EXIT is unique in that after first adoption an attempt at rollback meets structural resistance of such force that the probability of a successful rollback is close to zero.

This turns AB-EXIT not merely into "a reform with the best starting set of parameters" but into a reform that stays after adoption. Most reforms of the 20th–21st centuries are battles that must be fought continuously. AB-EXIT is a battle that is decided once and takes hold.

85.8. Re-read on 01.10.2026: where the rating holds and where it does not¶

On the architect's instruction: "after the Australian check this looks like advertising; go through it with the same rigour."

#	The June rating	What the check showed	Verdict
1	Clarity: "money or a ×3 vote", five seconds	Five seconds — true. "×3" is not a charter norm, the weight arises from arithmetic (033c §9b); Arizona showed that the opponent's first word is "bribery", and it must be answered with that, not with one's own slogan (023f)	Holds with a correction
2	Material incentive: "about 300 dollars on world average"	The size is a percentage of the median, the yardstick "desirable to 40–50 %" (048k §3); 300 dollars contradicts both this and the "month's wage" of 045; small sums do not move behaviour (023f §4)	The number does not hold, the principle does
3	Mechanism: two routes, "ready for most of the world"	Route A passed in Seattle (023d) and lost in Arizona (023f); Route B has been tested nowhere	Holds as a plan, not as a fact
4	Universality: "works even in semi-authoritarian systems"	The architect's correction: "by 'works' is meant a high probability of discussion and implementation of what the people support; no power anywhere needs it, but they will obstruct in different ways". In that sense it holds everywhere: people want it alike, and only the resistance differs — which of the four losing responses the power chooses (035 §84.3) and through which door the question enters (039: in an autocracy the protocol enters as a question before it enters as a payment)	Holds: the demand is universal, the resistance differs
5	Complementarity: remove the apathetic — deliberation works better	The architect: "a clever person with money and a wish to understand politics paid 700 dollars — and he, in your view, thinks and decides the same as those who have none of that? That is very strange." Measured from four sides: paying for accuracy cuts the partisan gap in factual beliefs by more than half (Bullock, Gerber, Hill, Huber 2015; Prior, Sood, Khanna 2015) — a stake makes people more accurate, not more biased; the poorly informed vote halfway between full information and a coin flip, with a three-point difference in outcomes (Bartels 1996); about three-quarters vote as they would with full information, the remaining quarter without it (Lau, Redlawsk); "enlightened preferences" differ from actual ones (Caplan)	Holds
6	Irreversibility: "not a single precedent of a mass payment being abolished", "the probability of rollback is close to zero"	Precedents exist: Alaska 2016 — the governor cut the dividend by veto, the court stripped the formula of protection (014 §14.3b); Hungary 2010 took the private pension savings by statute (029.4b). The architect's correction: "removed not by referendum" — neither payment was locked by referendum, and both were removed in one move of the executive or the legislature; this is 048g's argument for the referendum lock, not against irreversibility. 048g gives rollback 7–12 %, not zero	The June sentence is wrong as stated; correctly: there is no precedent of a referendum-locked payment being repealed by referendum

Separately, on facts and language:

"This is not self-praise — it is an operational fact" — a rating one gives oneself cannot be a fact; to be read as the assistant's estimate of June 2026.
"Macron emasculated the convention's proposals" — 023e: 146 of 149 accepted, about a hundred implemented in full or in part; what is true is that the recommendations bound nobody.
"Oregon 2028 ten times more likely after a pilot" — a multiplier from nowhere.
"RCV in seven states" — at state level in two (Maine, Alaska), the rest cities; to be checked before citing.
"The formula is fixed in a smart contract" — the 049 charter does not contain this, and by the decision "the right, not the methods" (048k §3) it should not; the lock is the referendum, not code.

What holds without correction: the analysis of the ten ideas (85.2), the six patterns of success (85.3), the four patterns of failure (85.4), the five consequences (85.6) except the multiplier. That part is written more strictly than the self-rating, and it remains in use. Refinement of 01.10.2026: three facts in 85.2 were corrected — the number of states with RCV, the year of adoption in San Francisco and the list of independent commissions; the section's conclusions do not change, and the Utah example adds an argument to 048g: a reform adopted by voters was rolled back by the legislature through an ordinary law.

Weak point of the review. The review was made against the repository and the three checks of this week; the ten ideas themselves were not re-verified on 01.10.2026, and the figures of 85.2 may have gone stale in four months. 🟡