The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
23f. Money at Elections: From Arizona to Trump in Twenty Years¶
Chapter: 05 — Empirical Base File: 05_023f · v1 · 30 September 2026 (session 30.09.26) Source: two open items from the comparison with the closest projects (006b): the Arizona referendum of 2006 and the field experiments paying for turnout; the architect's conclusion "people are not against money at elections; while we spend half a year discussing whether it is legal and whether people are ready, Trump simply went and promised to hand out money". Figures checked on 30.09.2026. The legal side is not considered here: the protocol pays for non-participation, not for a vote (045, 029.4).
1. Why this section exists¶
The only referendum on money at elections lost. The only cash draw among voters passed without consequences. The only promise to hand money to everyone was made by a sitting president. Three events in twenty years show one thing: the ban on the words "money" and "elections" in one sentence was lifted not by arguments but by practice.
2. Three steps¶
Arizona, 2006. The citizens' initiative "Voter Reward" of the physician Mark Osterloh: after every election, draw a million dollars among those who voted, the money from unclaimed lottery prizes. Against it — both parties and every major newspaper in the state, with the words "bribery", "cheapens the vote", "lottery". Result: 33.4 % for, 66.6 % against.
Musk, 2024. Two weeks before the presidential election the America PAC committee announced that every day it would give a million dollars to a registered voter in a swing state who signed a petition. The Philadelphia district attorney sued, calling it an "illegal lottery" and a "scam". The judge refused an injunction, and the draws continued until election day. No political price followed: the candidate the committee supported won.
Trump, 2026. At the first Republican convention in history held before the midterms a "Trump dividend" was announced: 5,000 dollars to every adult citizen if the majority is kept. Analysed in 059c; the polls there: there is demand, there is no trust.
| 2006 | 2024 | 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who proposes | a private person through an initiative | a candidate's committee | the sitting president |
| Who is paid | one random person among those who voted | one random person a day among those who signed | every adult |
| For what | for turnout | for a signature, that is, for registration and data | for the desired election outcome |
| What the elites said | "bribery", in a united front | "an illegal lottery", one prosecutor | analysed in 059c |
| How it ended | rejected two to one | the court did not stop it, the candidate won | the promise stands |
From "a taboo everyone strikes at" to "the winner's main promise" — twenty years. The word "bribery" was uttered every time, and every time it cost less.
3. How all three differ from the protocol¶
| Arizona, Musk, Trump | The protocol | |
|---|---|---|
| What is paid for | for coming, signing or voting the right way | for a declared exit from voting |
| To whom | to a random person or to one's own | to everyone who chose, by a formula in the law |
| Who pays | a private person, a committee, a promising power | the budget, regardless of who is in power |
| Whom it brings in | the apathetic to the polling station and onto the rolls | nobody; it leads the apathetic out |
| What the opponent is left to say | "you are buying turnout and votes" | "both rights are kept; the payment is for refusal, not for a vote" |
All three are purchases of participation: they pull to the polls those who do not care, and do so with a random prize or a promise. The protocol does the reverse. Arizona rejected the purchase of turnout by lottery; there has not yet been a referendum on payment for exit by formula.
4. Field experiments: the threshold of sensitivity to the sum¶
Panagopoulos (Journal of Politics, 2013) ran the first randomised field experiments with a monetary reward for turnout: Gilroy, California, November 2007, and a replication in Lancaster, California, April 2010. Voters were offered by mail from 1–2 to 10 and 25 dollars for taking part. Small sums did not move turnout; a noticeable sum did.
What follows for the protocol. First: people have a threshold below which money does not act on behaviour, and it is above a token sum — an argument against "a small payment to start with" and for the yardstick "desirable to 40–50 % of the population" (048k §3). Second: the experiments measured payment for turnout, the protocol pays for exit; the threshold does not carry over as a number, what carries over is the fact of its existence. Third: this is a calibration point for the simulator's formula (055c §6.3b) — its response to the sum has the same shape as the experiments: zero up to a threshold, growth after it.
5. The main conclusion¶
The architect: "people are not against money at elections. While we spend half a year discussing whether it is legal or not and how ready people are, Trump simply went and promised to hand out money — as a bribe."
The question "is society ready for money at elections" was closed not by us. Society accepted a million-dollar draw and a promise of five thousand from winners; it rejected only a lottery from a private person twenty years ago. The protocol does not need to prove that money is admissible — that was done for it. It needs to prove one thing: that its money goes for refusal, not for a vote; to everyone, not to one's own; by a formula, not by a promise. Everything else from the dispute over Arizona is words that have already lost their value.
6. Weak point¶
The three events come from one country, and the first two from a presidential campaign with a record budget; the conclusion "society accepted the money" rests on the winner having paid no price, not on a measurement of voters' attitude to a payment for exit. Panagopoulos's experiments give a threshold for payment for participation in two Californian towns; for payment for exit and for other countries there is no threshold, and the yardstick "40–50 %" remains an estimate. 🟡
Sources: Ballotpedia, "Arizona Proposition 200, Voter Reward Initiative (2006)"; Arizona Secretary of State, Publicity Pamphlet 2006, Prop. 200; Axios Philadelphia, 28.10.2024, and CNBC, 04.11.2024, on the Philadelphia district attorney's case against America PAC; 059c (the $5,000 promise); Panagopoulos C., "Extrinsic Rewards, Intrinsic Motivation and Voting", Journal of Politics 75(1), 2013.
Related: 059c (the Trump dividend, the death of the myth of the sacred vote) · 023c (compulsory voting: the fine as a mirror) · 023d (democracy vouchers: a case won) · 029.4 (not vote-buying; Hasen's three classes) · 045 (the US legal base) · 048k §3 (the yardstick of size) · 055c §6.3b (the simulator's formula) · 006b (predecessors)