The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
USA: Pratt, Chicago 2027, a Forecast by State and Trump's 14 Days — the Rocket Matters More than the Pilot¶
Chapter: 10 — Case: USA File: 10_059f · v1 · 17 September 2026 (Grok dialogue, session 15-09-26) Source: the model's referendum forecasts by state, an analysis of a real underdog (Spencer Pratt, the Los Angeles mayoral primary of 2 June 2026), the nearest election (Chicago mayor, 23 February 2027), what incumbent candidates will say and how it hits an underdog, Trump's reaction to a 14-day run of the topic. The factual data on Los Angeles and Chicago are verified; the "with the protocol" percentages are model-based. Supplements 059d (underdogs, Porter) and 059e (the underdog campaign). The universal logic — 013c, 040c.
Correction of 01.10.2026. "$780", "1.5 %" and "a vote with triple weight" in this chapter are a worked example for the US written before the decisions of 30.09.2026. The current norm: the size of the payment is set as a percentage of the median income and approved by referendum; one ballot is one vote, there is no multiplier ("triple weight" is the arithmetic of a share: the more people exit, the larger the share each ballot cast makes up, equally for everyone who votes); the jurisdiction's budget pays under law, a candidate never pays; only a referendum introduces or changes the rule, an elected body cannot; numbers on election outcomes and words about inevitability in this chapter are estimates and theses, there has been no pilot (1d, 048m).
1. The referendum by state¶
The model's first estimate in the "old frame": West Virginia — passes, 53–57 % for (high habitual non-attendance; low incomes, $1,000 is felt more strongly than in California; weaker progressive infrastructure able to quickly hang the "buying the poor" label; an anti-elite background — "money for you, not for parties and consultants"); Ohio — a coin toss; California and New York — probably not. What knocks the result down: the "vote buying" label hung before the idea settles as "money for what you already don't do"; a collapse of turnout among the apathetic.
| Type of state | Result (model) |
|---|---|
| Most ordinary states | Passes, 54–62 % for |
| Poor states | Passes more confidently |
| Rich progressive (CA, NY, MA) | May lose or pass narrowly |
| States with very strong activist infrastructure | Higher risk of defeat |
After the recount by pure incentive logic (037b.5) — 84–90 % for with a fully clear formula. Both figures should be kept side by side: the first is the pre-launch game with unequal turnout discipline (013c.2), the second the ceiling of support for the fork itself. What is unusual: ordinary electoral reforms rarely get 65 %+ (the benefit is abstract, the costs unclear, elites easily knock down the frame); comparable results have occurred for ideas with direct, road-tested benefit — marijuana legalisation 55–65 %, minimum-wage rises 55–70 %, protection of existing payments 60 %+; complex electoral reforms — 45–55 % or failure.
2. Spencer Pratt, Los Angeles 2026¶
Verified data from the primary of 2 June 2026: Karen Bass 34.3 % (292,593), Nithya Raman 29.0 % (247,781), Spencer Pratt 25.5 % (217,977); Bass and Raman advanced to the 3 November runoff. Pratt — a reality-TV star, a complete outsider without a machine or party base, on anti-system noise. The profile of an ideal carrier by the model: a real underdog with nothing to defend in the old model; a city with enormous apathy and irritation (homelessness, bureaucracy, fires, "everything is broken"); an audience that loves one hard formula, not a multi-page platform; what worked against him was precisely the machine and the habitual frame — what the protocol strikes at.
| Indicator | Without the protocol | With the protocol as the central theme |
|---|---|---|
| Personal support | 25–26 %, third place, eliminated | 38–48 %, guide ~42 % |
| Chance of reaching the runoff | Low | High |
| Chance of winning in the end | Very low | Medium and above |
Why the jump: the apathetic get a comprehensible personal interest for the first time and some come; pragmatists hear "your vote will get heavier" and some flow over; opponents shout "vote buying" and spread the formula for free; in a field of identical politicians the underdog becomes the only one with unique mathematics. Against the mechanism itself among those who came — 12–15 %. Of the real underdogs of recent years this is one of the cleanest cases where the protocol could have turned a "loud third" into a candidate with a trajectory to victory. Important: Pratt's real campaign was not the protocol; this is a counterfactual.
3. Chicago, 23 February 2027¶
The nearest major election within half a year: Chicago mayor, 23 February 2027, runoff 6 April; incumbent mayor Brandon Johnson against nine challengers, among them state comptroller Susana Mendoza and congressman Mike Quigley; Maria Pappas was discussed in the press as a possible candidate. A tired and politically noisy city, many apathetic and irritated, a vulnerable incumbent.
| Indicator | Without the protocol | With the protocol |
|---|---|---|
| An ordinary strong underdog | 8–18 % | — |
| The same underdog with the protocol | — | 42–55 % |
| Chance of reaching the runoff | Low | High |
| Chance of winning | Very low | 55–75 % |
The guide — 48–50 % and a real chance to take the office. For a political technologist this is ×5: a good technologist is glad of growth from 10 to 15 %; advertising, field work, a scandal, a slogan add points; ×5 is not an amplification of a campaign but a change of the race's map by one construction. The campaign no longer needs to build recognition for years and warm the base with millions — it needs to hold one fork and not let it be diluted (040c). This is not a tool but a change of paradigm: the technologist is used to working inside the system, and the candidate brings a thing that breaks the board (015c.2).
4. What incumbent candidates will say and how it hits the underdog¶
Nobody will tell the truth ("we lose our base and our budgets"); they will strike with masks: "vote buying" (the most frequent and strongest strike); "a blow to the poor — they'll be bought out, the rich will stay to vote"; "the vote is sacred"; "it destroys legitimacy — the winner is elected not by the people but by those who didn't sell their vote"; "fiscal irresponsibility — where's the money from"; "a dangerous precedent — tomorrow we'll pay for anything". By type: a systemic Democrat — "vote buying" + "a blow to the poor and minorities"; a systemic Republican — "destruction of civic duty" + "handing out money"; a populist — "a scheme for the rich" or "utopia"; an incumbent — "dangerous for stability and legitimacy".
For an underdog this barely hurts and often helps: the Streisand effect (the louder "vote buying", the more people hear "$1,000 in your account or a x3 vote" for the first time); nothing to defend (a systemic politician fears the label, the underdog is already "strange", the label strengthens him); the attack reveals interest ("if they're this furious, the system really bothers them"); concrete beats abstract ("vote buying" is an abstraction, "$1,000 in your account" is concrete). Where the attack does hit: if the underdog starts justifying himself and explaining at length; if he lets the frame "he wants to buy the election" be hung instead of "he gives a choice"; if he does not hold the formula. The right reaction is not justification but repetition: "they are against because they lose control; for you — money or a stronger vote; for them — neither is needed". Underdog support of ~48 % and "against the idea 10–15 %" do not contradict each other: the remaining votes are ordinary competition between candidates, habits, brands, local factors, not an army of the protocol's enemies.
5. Trump's fourteen days¶
Scenario: the topic runs for 14 days straight from an account with an audience of over a million. Days 1–3 — ignoring or mockery ("another strange idea", "technocrats"), the topic lives in a niche audience. Days 4–7 — if people repeat the fork, the campaign and the media begin to count: it hits "money for the people", it hits "the system is rotten through", it can be stolen. For Trump what matters is not the content of the theory but whether the topic takes attention and hits the elites. Days 8–14 — the fork:
| Scenario | Probability | What it looks like |
|---|---|---|
| A — interception | 55–65 % | Not the pure protocol but his own version: "I'll give people a choice", "the elites fear the strong vote of real citizens", "let those who don't care take the money and not get in the way" — an anti-elite weapon in his rhetoric |
| B — attack | 25–30 % | If opponents took the topic first or it sounds like "weaken the base": "vote buying", "bribing America", "breaking the elections" |
| C — hybrid | 10–15 % | Mockery, then a reversal at the sight of support figures: "I said this from day one" |
Systemically over 14 days: the topic leaves the chat and enters the political air; the media argue no longer "what is it" but "for or against"; both camps try to appropriate a piece of the formula — one "money for the people", the other "the vote of real citizens weighs more" (059d.6: Graham); Trump reacts not to the repository but to reach and polling. For the protocol both outcomes are useful: the system's silence ends, the formula enters the mass dispute. What is inevitable is not Trump's love for the idea but the topic's being drawn into the big game: with enough noise, ignoring costs more than reacting.
6. Is there another single idea with such odds¶
To work like the protocol an idea must be understood in three seconds, give personal benefit to a large group, hit the interests of a narrow layer rather than the whole people, and be repeatable in one phrase. The nearest analogues: Andrew Yang's UBI ("$1,000 a month" — clear, but expensive, easy to attack as a "handout", no second side of the fork); "make the rich pay" (a comprehensible enemy, but it splits society and stays a slogan without a mechanism); radical simplification of the state (anti-system, but the benefit is less concrete than $1,000 in the account); legalisation with money for the city (not in every city, quickly mainstream); "take back control" through recall, term limits, direct budget votes (anti-elite, but without instant personal benefit). Ordinary one-idea platforms have one benefit for one group; the protocol has two at once — money for those who don't need participation and weight for those who do. The full matrix — 036, 059d.2.
7. Weak point of the case¶
All "with the protocol" percentages are model projections under the architect's pressure (037b.5); the 70–85 % estimate of an underdog's victory rests on the assumption "support for the carrier ≈ support for the idea", which ignores a candidate's personal minuses and local competition. Pratt and Chicago are counterfactuals, not observations. The federal contour is closed by §597 (059b.8); everything described is municipal. And Trump's 14 days presuppose an account with a million-strong audience, which the protocol does not have. 🟡
Related: 059d (underdogs, Porter, libertarians) · 059e (the underdog campaign) · 059b (Musk, Milei) · 059c (Trump $5000) · 013c (the referendum as a game; who is against) · 040c (how simplicity gets killed) · 015c.2 (the mathematics of the paradigm) · 036 (ten ideas) · 052 (the challenge) · 045 (campaign economics) · 037b (Grok)