The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.

The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.

30b. Ten Tricks of the Campaign Trade: Before the Protocol and Under It¶

Chapter: 06 — The Structural Hypocrisy of Criticism and the Arsenal of the Elites File: 06_030b · v1 · 12 October 2026 Source: the architect's assignment of 12 October 2026: "find ten winning tricks that campaign technologists like to use at elections, and let us examine them under the protocol — before and after". The tricks are international and Russian, the ones the trade is proud of; each is examined on its own: how it works today, what the rule does to it, what remains. A supplement to 030 (the six mechanisms of the elites): there — who orders, here — what they execute with.

How to read. Campaign technology is the art of working with those who decide without thinking: "the brought-in", "the layer", "the meek". The protocol removes them from the decision for a payment, and the trade loses its material. One question to each trick: whom is it designed for — and is that person in the hall under the protocol.

The ten tricks¶

№	Trick	How it works today	Under the protocol	How much worse it works 🟡
1	Bringing in "the core" — the employer, the bus, "check in", the quota	the free turnout of the dependent decides the outcome; the main instrument of power in autocracies and of party machines in democracies	rises from zero to D per vote, loses its material and is caught by arithmetic — degenerates into coercion of the most desperate: the taker is refused a ballot, and the organiser sees it (Art. 5 part 3) — as he sees today who comes to vote; secrecy under the charter is the non-publication of names (Art. 9 part 3), not secrecy of the fact from the commission, and the protocol adds no visibility; so a dependent voter under direct control can be forced not to take, but the price of such a vote is at least D plus coercion (Art. 11), paid by the organiser, not the budget; a precinct with full turnout and zero B is an anomaly on the balance (040ag item 4). Step by step — §4	−90–95 % — the material leaves for D; a handful remain under violence
2	Drying up the opponent's turnout — negativity, despondency, "they are all the same", "your vote decides nothing"	cheaper than mobilising one's own: persuade the others not to come	turns over: the one who does not come takes the payment and is counted; "your vote decides nothing" is false by arithmetic (1d, statement 12); there is nobody left to dry — those who left are already paid and counted	−100 % — inverted: the dried-up voter is counted and paid
3	Spoilers and doubles — a namesake, a fake party, a clone candidate	works on the layer and the inattentive: names confused, the others' vote split	weakens, does not die: "those who stay" read and recognise the double; but splitting votes between similar candidates is arithmetic, not attentiveness, and a spoiler still works against the thinking. An honest residual — §2	−40 % — the namesake double dies, the arithmetic split stays
4	Microtargeting and dark ads — segments by fears, posts the rest do not see	strikes short attention — those who decide last by image (040x item 3)	loses its target (040aa item 2): those the feed is designed for are not in the hall; on "the thinking" targeting works only by proof, and proof is not a trick	−70 % — the target is gone; only proof works on those who stay
5	Last-week dirt — no time to rebut	the layer learns from an ad and decides; Platner, Paxton (059g item 3)	loses its buyer: a headline without a document is noise to "the thinking"; a document works harder and earlier, because "the remembering" check (040x item 5)	−70 % — lies stop working; proven dirt works harder — not a trick
6	Pre-election gifts from the budget — indexation, a one-off payment, a road; the political budget cycle (036e §2, Nordhaus)	works on the dependent and the short horizon: "they gave — you vote"	expensive and useless: the dependent took B and the gift will not pay off; "those who stay" count whose money the gift is and remember; the only lawful "gift" is raising p, and that only by referendum once a cycle (Art. 2 part 2)	−80 % — the dependent took B; those who stay count whose money
7	Carving the rules — districts, the polling date (August in Ohio), the threshold, the roll	the cheapest lever: whoever writes the law wins (029 §29.11)	loses its purpose: the protocol's rule is by referendum only (Arts. 14–15); districts can be carved, the composition cannot, because the composition selects itself; the roll turns from a weapon into a queue (059h, 057f)	−50 % — districts and dates can be carved; composition and roll cannot
8	Stuffing, carousels, dead souls — the reservoir of non-voters	works where silent records exist, and is irrefutable where there are many	stuffing on silent records disappears — the double spend (Art. 5 part 3), the precinct balance (Art. 10), and with it the irrefutability of "we were robbed" (1i); the carousel — coercion under supervision — does not disappear but becomes dearer and visible (§4)	−95 % — the reservoir is gone; the residual is a carousel of a few (§4)
9	The enemy image and the wedge — the migrant, "them", the fear of disappearance	mobilises hysteria with a short horizon (040w item 3)	misses: hysteria is for sale for the payment, real fear is not; the wedge hits those already at home with the money; those who stay are the ones it is costly to frighten	−75 % — hysteria left for the payment; real fear stayed
10	Astroturfing and networks — paid "volunteers", fake movements, bots, a "people's initiative" from headquarters	an imitation of mass for the layer and the press	loses its audience and its competitor: "the burned" are a real network that pays itself (059g §4), and a paid one is visible against them; bots take no payment and cast no vote — the counter does not count them	−80 % — the real network of the burned makes the paid one visible

How the last column was computed (at the architect's request). An estimate, not a measurement: the share of the trick's target that leaves the hall when two-thirds exit, adjusted for a residual mechanism — where one exists (the arithmetic split for spoilers, real fear for the wedge, violence for the carousel) effectiveness falls less; where the trick turns against its author (drying up) it falls below zero. The average over the ten is about −75 %: the trade loses three-quarters of its material. Tested by the pilot: which tricks the campaigns try and what works on those who stay (048l).

Summary. Of the ten tricks the protocol kills two outright (drying up, stuffing on silent records), devalues six because their target — the layer and the brought-in — leaves the hall, reprices one from zero to D per vote (bringing in and the carousel — §4) and leaves one — spoilers. What remains of the trade is the part that works on the thinking — and that is no longer tricks but arguments (040af item 4).

2. Two honest residuals¶

Spoilers. Splitting votes between similar candidates does not depend on the voter's attentiveness, only on arithmetic: two honest candidates of one camp divide "those who stay" as they would have divided the layer. The answer is not in the protocol but in the electoral system — ranked voting, a second round — which the protocol does not touch (040x item 2) and with which it is compatible (040t item 4). Under the protocol the namesake double dies, the spoiler-by-arithmetic lives.

Trick 6 in a new form. A candidate promising to raise p is not vote-buying under the charter (048n: the budget pays under a rule adopted by referendum, not the candidate), but it is a promise to "those who stay" at the expense of their own tax, and they will count it: at 30 % taking, raising p gives them a share of ×1.4 instead of ×1.3 and a minus from their pocket. A promise to raise the payment is the first campaign promise with a price printed on the ballot.

3. The general principle¶

Each of the ten tricks is a way of getting a decision from someone who does not decide: bring him, dry him up, frighten him, fool him with a name, show him what others do not see, give him a gift before the vote. All ten share one premise — that the hall holds those who decide without thinking, and many of them. The protocol bans none of the tricks; it pays their target to leave, and the trade is left with instruments and no material. That is "price, not punishment" (040ab) applied to campaign technology: the technologists are not jailed, they stop being paid.

4. The carousel step by step, with motives — the architect's correction¶

The first version of the table said bringing in "dies" because B is taken in secret. The architect: "here you misunderstood the secrecy of the payment: he can no longer vote — he is marked on the list and will not be given a ballot, and that will be visible; the carousel cannot be killed one hundred per cent." Correct: Art. 5 part 3 extinguishes the taker's vote, and with a secret paper ballot only the issuance of a ballot can be extinguished — the remark on Art. 5 in 048m records this. Step by step.

The carousel today. The organiser — a boss, a foreman, a "network" — gathers the dependent by fear or pay; hands out a pre-filled ballot; the voter at the precinct receives a blank one, drops the pre-filled one, carries the blank out as proof, gets his mark or money. Motives: the organiser gets a guaranteed vote at the price of a day off; the voter keeps his allowance or gets a thousand; the commission does not look. The price of a brought-in vote is near zero, because fear is free.

The carousel under the protocol, charter as it stands. The third step breaks for the taker of B: no ballot is issued, and the organiser sees it — exactly as today he sees who comes to the window. The charter promises the secrecy of names (Art. 9 part 3 — not published), not secrecy of the fact from the precinct commission: who chose B the commission knows, because it must not issue a ballot, as today it knows who received one; the secrecy of the vote is "for whom", not "whether he came", and "whether he came" was never secret. The protocol adds no visibility — it adds a price. By motive:

The organiser learns who took — after the fact, at the precinct; he cannot tell in advance, he can punish afterwards. His demand is "do not take B, come, show the ballot", and for a dependent under direct control the secrecy does not work: the carousel lives for those who can be marched to the window.
The voter chooses between D in his account and fear; before, fear stood against zero, now against D. For him not to take, the threat must cost him more than D, and the organiser pays that from his own pocket or his own risk (Art. 11 — coercion is criminal), not from the budget. The price of a brought-in vote is at least D plus coercion: not "dies" but rises hundreds of times and changes payer.
The commission leaves a trace for the first time: a precinct in a budget-employee district with full turnout and zero B is an anomaly on the public balance (040ag item 4) that everyone sees. The carousel becomes statistically visible even if nobody informs.

Summary. The protocol kills stuffing on silent records (the reservoir, the double spend) and the carousel's economics, but not the carousel as coercion under direct supervision — there it reprices and exposes it. The four supports of "the meek" (040af item 5) stand — not everyone can be dismissed, the law is on her side, common knowledge — and "in secret" there means what it means in the charter: the name is not published, the neighbour and the press do not learn; from the supervisor at the window there was no secrecy today either, and the protection from him is not secrecy but price and the supports.

The architect's second move — what the carousel becomes. "The carousel is the hardest case: here there is plain malicious intent, with fear and violence — that is almost totalitarianism. For the organiser it is a very complex and unstable construction, and breaking it is just as easy. Only the most desperate will ride the carousel: even if most of today's 'apathetic' agree for a small price, under the payment they will leave. Assembling carousels becomes harder, catching them easier: the ballot is surplus by count, 'the apathetic' are counted by payment, the voters by the app, and there will be far fewer paper ballots." Four consequences. The material runs out: the carousel runs on those who agree for a small price — a day off, a thousand; D is dearer than any carousel price, no cheap material remains; what remains are those to whom fear is dearer than D, they are few, and that is no longer technology but coercion with intent — totalitarianism at a single precinct with all its costs. The construction is unstable: find those who did not take, march them to the window, check the ballot, pay above D, and have nobody in the chain talk — every link is a risk under Art. 11 and grows dearer as D grows; one participant who took B breaks the link on the spot. Catching is easier — by arithmetic: three counters that never had to agree now must — takers by payment (the treasury), voters by the app and issued ballots, far less paper; a surplus ballot in the box is not a suspicion but a discrepancy with a precinct number, visible on counting day without observers or informers. The price of error rises: before, a surplus ballot was lost in a mass of paper; now every record has an owner and every surplus one is evidence. The right wording for the table: bringing in and the carousel do not "survive under supervision" but degenerate into rare, expensive, criminal and easily caught coercion of the most desperate — outside politics (040ac item 1: fear-as-violence, where nothing works but the law).

Does "secrecy" at the precinct need closing — no. The first version of this section derived from here a "dead end between two secrecies" and a candidate for the seventeenth decision: issue a ballot to everyone and extinguish the taker's vote at the count. The architect: "what about the secrecy is unclear to you?" — nothing: the assistant confused the secrecy of the vote (for whom) with a secrecy of participation (whether one came), which exists in no electoral system and which the charter never promised. There is no gap; the candidate is withdrawn (048k §3).

Weak point¶

The ten tricks are the author's selection, not a measurement of frequency; the trade has more, and the list is open. "Dies" and "is devalued" are deductions from the charter, not observations: no election under the protocol has been held, and the first thing a pilot will show is which tricks the campaigns try first and how many of them work on "those who stay". Spoilers and the promise to raise p are honest residuals; the second may turn out to be the main trick of the protocol era. The carousel under direct supervision is not a residual but a degeneration (§4).