The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.

The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.

48b. The W-2 via the SSA: the American Implementation of the Data Source¶

Chapter: 10 — Case: USA File version: v1 Date: 2026-06-11 · moved 2026-09-15 Source: moved from §2 and §3 during the universalisation of v6.58.0

How to read this chapter (note of 02.10.2026). The text contains wording that is easy to misread: "a x2 vote", "x3", "the weight of a vote" are the arithmetic of a share, not a multiplier: every ballot counts as one; the efficiency bonus has been removed; numbers on election outcomes and words about inevitability are estimates and theses, not established facts: there has been no pilot. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.

The universal requirements for the source of median-wage data are formulated in §2. This section shows how they are met in the USA: by Form W-2, which the employer files with the SSA.

48b.1. Why the W-2 specifically¶

The W-2 is the employer's reporting form to the SSA on the wages of each worker. It is not a survey and not a worker's declaration. It is a document from the employer, confirmed bilaterally.

What the W-2 counts (CORRECTLY included)¶

Wages of employees
Bonuses
Commissions
All forms of pay for labour from an employer in the given city

What the W-2 does NOT count (CORRECTLY excluded)¶

Pensions (a federal transfer, not the city's production)
Social Security payments (federal)
Benefits / welfare (a transfer, not production)
Investment income (not work)
Inheritance (not production)
Alimony (a transfer between citizens)

Why excluding pensions is CORRECT¶

A pension is not the city's income. It is a transfer from the federal budget or from past savings. Including pensions creates a perverse incentive: the mayor attracts rich pensioners instead of creating jobs. The W-2 measures the city's NET economic productivity — only what is earned here, by this employer, by this worker.

The self-employed (1099)¶

The self-employed have no W-2 but PRODUCE in the city. Their median income ($36K) is below the median W-2 ($45K). Including the self-employed would lower the median. The coefficient 1.5 (household) already contains an indirect correction. An additional coefficient is NOT NEEDED.

48b.2. Protection of W-2 data: five levels¶

AB-EXIT creates NO NEW incentive to distort the W-2 (unlike the Census, where AB-EXIT would create an incentive to inflate income in a survey without punishment). The W-2 is protected by five levels, each working independently.

Level 1: Triple copying. The W-2 exists in three copies simultaneously: a copy to the worker, a copy to the SSA, a copy to the IRS. All three are reconciled automatically. If the employer stated $30K and the worker stated $40K in his return — the mismatch is detected automatically and triggers an audit. Forging one copy is impossible — all three must be forged simultaneously in three different organisations.

Level 2: Payroll software. 95 %+ of employers in the USA use automated payroll: ADP, Paychex, QuickBooks, Gusto. The software calculates wages, withholdings and W-2s automatically on the basis of real bank transactions. The employer does not fill in the W-2 by hand — the system generates the forms from actual payments. Forging a W-2 = hacking corporate payroll software and bank records. This is not accounting fraud — it is cybercrime.

Level 3: Worker-witnesses. Every worker knows his wage. Everyone receives a pay stub every 2 weeks. Everyone receives a copy of the W-2 in January. A mismatch between the W-2 and the real wage = a worker's complaint to the IRS. One aggrieved fired employee = one call = an audit of the whole company. An employer with 50 employees = 50 potential witnesses in 1 year, 500 in 10 years.

Level 4: Criminal punishment (REALLY applied). Employment tax fraud (forging W-2s / failing to remit withheld taxes):

Statute: 26 USC §7202, §7206, §7201
Punishment: up to 5 years in prison + a $10,000 fine FOR EACH YEAR of violation
IRS Criminal Investigation: conviction rate 90–97.3 % (the HIGHEST of all federal agencies)
300–400 criminal cases for employment tax fraud annually
Average prison term: 37 months (2022–2024 data)
66 % of the convicted receive a REAL sentence

Specific cases (2023–2024 only, employment tax only):

January 2024: a payroll-company owner, Oregon — 2+ years in prison
October 2023: the CFO of a construction firm — 2 years in prison
November 2023: the owners of a landscaping firm, Pennsylvania — guilty
June 2024: a businesswoman, Virginia — convicted
April 2024: a payroll-company owner, Maryland — guilty + theft from workers' 401(k)
March 2024: a businessman, Florida — prison

The IRS treats failure to remit withheld payroll taxes as THEFT from the worker (money withheld from the wage but not passed to the state), which explains the high priority of prosecution and the severity of punishment.

Level 5: The statistical impossibility of mass forgery. For AB-EXIT what matters is not a specific W-2 but the MEDIAN for the city. To shift the median, MASS forgery is needed:

Detroit: 180,000 W-2 forms. The median = the 90,000th in the list
Shifting the median by 5 % ($1,900) requires ~9,000 simultaneous forgeries
9,000 employers must simultaneously: forge payroll software + bank records + three copies of the W-2 + risk prison at a 97 % conviction rate + avoid complaints from all workers
Coordinating 9,000 independent crimes = PHYSICALLY impossible
Forgery by one employer (10 W-2s out of 180,000) = 0.006 % = statistical noise, the median DOES NOT SHIFT

For comparison: forging the Census requires ~1,000 of 20,000 respondents (5 %) to inflate income individually, without coordination, without punishment. That is EASY. Forging the W-2 = IMPOSSIBLE.

48b.3. Why AB-EXIT creates NO new incentive to distort the W-2¶

Census: before AB-EXIT the incentive to lie = $0. After AB-EXIT the incentive to lie = $600+ (the dividend). Punishment = $0. Conclusion: AB-EXIT BREAKS the Census.

IRS/W-2: before AB-EXIT the incentive to understate = tax savings. After AB-EXIT the incentive = the same. Punishment = prison. Conclusion: AB-EXIT DOES NOT BREAK the W-2 (the incentive is unchanged, the protection is not weakened).

48b.4. Cross-verification and the four-agency rule¶

Source	Role	Frequency
SSA W-2	PRIMARY (calculation)	Annually
IRS SOI	Verification	Annually (with a lag)
Census ACS	Verification of household structure	Annually
BLS QCEW	Quarterly trend check	Quarterly

The divergence rule: if the PRIMARY (SSA) and any of the verification sources diverge by more than 10 % — an automatic independent audit. The auditor is appointed by the judicial branch. Results are public within 90 days.

The four-agency rule: the dividend calculation continues as long as AT LEAST ONE of the four agencies (SSA, IRS, Census, BLS) publishes income data. Four federal agencies must cease to exist simultaneously for AB-EXIT to lose its data source.

48b.5. The mayor controls NOT A SINGLE variable¶

Variable	Who controls	Can the mayor influence it?
M (median wage)	SSA (federal agency)	NO
CPI (inflation)	BLS (federal agency)	NO
K (1 %)	The charter (referendum)	NO
1.5 (household)	The charter (once a decade)	NO
N (recipients)	Citizens (free choice)	NO