AB-EXIT · Electoral Simulation System

A patch for democracy.

AB-EXIT is designed to improve the quality of executive government by changing electoral incentives—not by replacing democracy. It adds one voluntary choice to existing elections, so politicians must compete for a smaller, more engaged electorate while every citizen receives a meaningful option.

A · Keep your voteVote for candidates as usual. When others choose B, fewer ballots decide the result—so each remaining vote carries more relative weight.
B · Take the paymentReceive a transparent public payment and give up voting only in this election cycle. Your voting rights return at the next election.

The goal: better candidates, longer-term decisions, and a more accountable executive branch. The mechanism: citizens choose immediate personal value or greater political influence. These four simulations test the mechanism; they do not treat the promised improvement as already proven.

Test AB-EXIT →0 of 4 tests openedAbout this project
One payment set in the first module$2,000the later modules cannot change it
Synthetic scenario median income$90,000used by both referendum modules
1

Referendum Lab

Set the payment and compare AB-EXIT with a one-time universal payment of the same face value.

Test the mechanism → 2

Equal Budget Lab

Hold total spending constant and compare AB-EXIT with a genuine monthly UBI.

Match the cost → 3

Awareness Lab

Separate unknown non-participation from explicit A and B decisions.

Measure engagement → 4

Underdog Lab

Apply the same mechanism to Alaska's 2022 gubernatorial election.

Replay a real election →
One shared input
The payment is never tuned to obtain a preferred result in each module.
Four distinct tests
Popularity, cost, engagement, and election outcomes remain separate questions.
One evidence boundary
Exact arithmetic is separated from synthetic behavioral hypotheses.