The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.

The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.

40ba. Turnout Theory: Blais, Ferejohn and Fiorina, Franklin, Wolfinger and Rosenstone — Five Arguments: Duty Holds Turnout, Minimax Regret, the Habit of First Elections, Education Decides, the Price of Registration¶

Chapter: 06 — The Structural Hypocrisy of Criticism and the Arsenal of the Elites File: 06_040ba · v1 · 16 October 2026 Source: the architect's assignment of 16 October 2026 ("Put them all in the repo"). André Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote? The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory (2000); John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, "The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis" (1974); Mark Franklin, Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945 (2004); Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone, Who Votes? (1980). One chapter for four works, because their blow is one: turnout is held not by calculation but by duty and habit, and the protocol is the first to put a price on duty. Written without a move by the architect.

How to read. Downs's calculus (013 §13.2) explains turnout poorly: by Blais about half of voters go out of a sense of duty, by Franklin turnout is a habit of the first three elections, by Wolfinger and Rosenstone the strongest predictor is education. The chapter shows that the protocol does not abolish duty but gives it a price for the first time, and that the habit of first elections becomes the habit of the first choice "take or stay".

0. What they claim¶

Blais: the rational model explains little; duty is the main motive of about half of those who vote; those who do calculate the probability of deciding the outcome vote no less than the rest. Ferejohn and Fiorina: the voter does not compute probabilities but minimises maximum regret — "what if my vote would have decided, and I did not come." Franklin: turnout is a habit formed in a young voter's first three elections and depends on how competitive and consequential those elections were; generations that entered politics under uncompetitive elections do not vote all their lives. Wolfinger and Rosenstone: education is the strongest predictor of turnout, stronger than income; the registration closing date is a measurable cost that lowers turnout.

1. Duty holds turnout, not calculation; the payment strikes at duty, and everything follows¶

Argument. Half go out of duty; put a price on duty and duty becomes a commodity, and commodities get bought.

Answer. This is 1g "It will destroy civic duty" with numbers, and the answer is the same: the protocol does not abolish duty, it places the price of the alternative beside it. The one for whom duty is worth less than D leaves; the one for whom it is worth more stays, and his duty for the first time has a measured price — the refusal of the payment. A duty that survives a price is real; a duty that does not was holding turnout by bringing-in and packages (057d §3b). By Blais half vote out of duty — so half will stay under any D, and that is the lower bound of those who stay, matching the estimate of 040al §4.

Residual. None.

2. Minimax regret: people go so as not to regret; the payment removes regret by replacing it with money¶

Argument. If I took the payment and my vote would have decided — there is no regret, there is money; the protocol kills the one motive that works.

Answer. The protocol moves regret, it does not remove it. Today there is one regret: "I did not come, and I would have decided." Under the protocol there are two, both with a price: "I took, and I would have decided" and "I stayed, and everyone took, and my vote changed nothing, and I lost D." The second is the daily game of 040an §3: everyone recomputes his stake until election day. Minimax with two priced regrets is exactly the decision by substance that Ferejohn and Fiorina did not have: theirs was about probability, under the protocol it is about the stake.

Residual. None.

3. The habit of first elections: those who entered under uncompetitive elections never vote; the protocol will produce a generation that began with a cheque¶

Argument. Franklin: turnout is a habit formed in the first three elections; generations that entered politics under uncompetitive elections do not vote all their lives. A young voter whose first election is "take $800" will never come.

What the repository already answers.

The repository's forecast: the young are exactly the ones who stay. 016 §25.5 and the pilot measurement table 048l §4: of those aged 18–25 about 70 % stay, of those over 75 about 15 %. The reason is the horizon: the young will live here forty more years. The argument assumes the young will take; the repository predicts the opposite.
Habit is not motivation, and the protocol filters precisely habit. 016 records that pensioners' high turnout is the habit "I have voted all my life", not a stake; those voting from habit take the payment, because money outweighs habit.
Franklin himself names the condition of the habit — the competitiveness of first elections. For those who stay, elections under the protocol are more competitive: fewer votes, each weighs double, the count stops being foregone — the young no longer know in advance that the old cannot be outvoted (40bi §4).
The choice is made anew every cycle (048m art. 5): one who took at his first election is not lost — for the first time he knows the price of his absence.

Proof by contradiction (on the pattern of §2 in 040ax, at the architect's suggestion). Accept Franklin's argument in full: habit forms in the first elections, and a young person who first takes the payment will get used to taking and never come to vote.

Today the same habit forms for free. By Franklin himself, generations that entered under a foregone count are already used to not voting. Today their absence gives them nothing — no money, no weight, no count. Under the protocol a "habit of taking" replaces a "habit of not going": the same absence, but paid, counted and added up into a demand, a bill and the weight of those who stay (40bg §4c). Compared with what exists — only gain.
Taking is not absence but an act. By the theory of habit, habit forms on a repeated act. The repeated act under the protocol is not "did not come" but "decided": every cycle the person answers a question with a price. The habit that forms is the habit of weighing one's stake before every election. The assumption "to take is to get used to non-participation" contradicts the fact that taking is itself participation: counted, paid and affecting the government.
For those who stay, the conditions of the habit are better than today. Franklin: the habit of voting comes from competitive first elections. Under the protocol first elections are more competitive for those who stay — so by his own theory their habit of voting is stronger than that of today's young.

The fork. Either the theory of habit is false, and the young choose by horizon — then by the 016 forecast they stay more than anyone. Or the theory is true — then under the protocol those who take at their first election form a habit of deciding with a price instead of a free habit of absence, and those who stay form a habit of voting under conditions more competitive than today's. There is no third case: the habit argument is either false or confirms the protocol.

The architect's move: Franklin's people do not think. "Do his people not think? Animals with a reflex? Does the double weight not concern them?" The theory of habit describes a world where incentives do not change: one vote, a foregone count, absence costs nothing — people fix what they did at their first elections and stop recalculating; habit is a saving on thinking where there is nothing to think about. The protocol changes incentives at every election: every cycle a question with a price is put — money or a vote that weighs double — and that is exactly the new signal that demands recalculation. And Franklin himself confirms it: his condition of habit is the competitiveness of first elections, that is, people respond to whether their vote decides; that is calculation, not reflex. A model in which habit is set by the significance of the vote cannot at the same time claim that the significance of the vote — double weight — does not concern people.

The composition of the hall in numbers. By the 016 forecast the young under 35 almost double their share of the hall (21 % → 38 %), those over 65 shrink to 12 % (from 30 %); the hall hardly shrinks (56 % → 52 % of adults) — 016 §25.5. The architect: "such numbers would satisfy even Franklin, hypothetically — though to me it is again the steam engine and the diesel."

Residual. Whether the pilot confirms that the young stay more often than the old is a second- and third-cycle measurement (048l §4).

4. Education decides: those who stay are the educated — Brennan without the test¶

Argument. The strongest predictor of turnout is education; it will also predict who stays.

Answer. Education predicts turnout where turnout costs skills (040ax §2); the protocol's one question costs none. And 19b.1: income, education and being informed are three different scales, and about a mechanism that pays everyone is informed. Brennan filters from outside by a test; the protocol leaves the assessment to the person (040au §4). Their own data: education is stronger than income — so the poor educated stay too, and that breaks the argument "those who stay are the rich" from inside.

Residual. None.

5. The price of registration is measurable and lowers turnout; the protocol is the largest price possible¶

Argument. A registration closing date costs several points of turnout; D costs tens.

Answer. Their scale is the price of coming. The protocol leaves the price of coming unchanged and sets a price on not coming — paid by the state (040az §4). These are different quantities: registration takes from the person, the payment gives. And turnout is not the protocol's aim (040ar §4: the yardstick is the quality of decisions, ×2–×4); their own work shows that turnout responds to price, so the share of takers will respond to D as they would predict — which makes it a measurable quotation (013g §3b).

Residual. None.

6. What they give the protocol¶

A lower bound of those who stay — half, by duty (Blais). The form of the decision — minimax with two priced regrets. A forecast about habit: the first choice forms a generation, and that is a pilot measurement. And proof that turnout responds to price — so the share of takers will be an honest number.

Summary¶

Argument	What is true	Answer	What remains
duty holds turnout	yes, half of it	duty gets a price, not abolition; half is the lower bound of those who stay	—
minimax regret	yes	two priced regrets instead of one unpriced; a decision about the stake, not the probability	—
the habit of first elections	yes	the repository's forecast: the young stay (~70 % of 18–25); proof by contradiction: the habit argument is either false or confirms the protocol	whether the young stay more than the old — a second- and third-cycle measurement
education decides	yes, where turnout costs skills	the one question costs no skills; the poor educated stay	—
the price of registration	yes	the price of coming is unchanged; a price is set on not coming, paid by the state	—

Weak point¶

Four works in one chapter; "half out of duty" is Blais's estimate, not a cross-country measurement. One residual — whether the young stay more than the old, the pilot's second and third cycle. Written without a move by the architect, except the proof by contradiction in §3.

Related: 013 §13.2 · 040an §3 · 040al §4 · 040ar §4 · 040au §4 · 040av §2 · 040ax §2 · 040az §4 · 040d · 019b §19b.1 · 1g · 013g §3b · 048m art. 5 · 048l