The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
6b. Predecessors in the Genre and What Remains to Be Written¶
Chapter: 02 — History File: 02_006b · v1 · 30 September 2026 (sessions of 20.09 and 29.09.26) Source: two questions by the architect — "we have almost described a new state; are there such works in history, compare, what are we missing" (20.09) and "find ten works of the last hundred years at the same level of conceptuality" (29.09); a revision of the list of gaps on 29.09. Complements 006 (the gallery of thinkers one by one), 036 §85 (ten modern reforms on five parameters) and 013.12 (the pantheon of incentive machines).
How to read this chapter (note of 02.10.2026). The text contains wording that is easy to misread: sums and formulas with coefficients are worked examples: the size of the payment is set as a percentage of the median income approved by referendum; "a x2 vote", "x3", "the weight of a vote" are the arithmetic of a share, not a multiplier: every ballot counts as one; a "reversible" choice means "at the next election": within one election exit is final. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.
1. Why this section exists¶
The repository compares the protocol with thinkers one by one and with the reforms of the last twenty years. A comparison with works of the same genre — where one norm or one mechanism rebuilds a system through the interests of its participants — was missing. The section gives two tables and derives a roadmap from them: what the predecessors have and we do not.
2. Before 1926: designs of a whole state¶
| Work | What it describes | What is shared | What they have and we do not |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Federalist (1787–88) | 85 papers defending a specific constitution, each objection taken in turn | The genre coincides almost exactly: a design, an arsenal of answers to critics, a reliance on self-interest ("ambition must be made to counteract ambition") | A full text that can be adopted tomorrow |
| Harrington, Oceana (1656) | A republic as a mechanism: rotation, the secret ballot, "one divides, the other chooses" | The state as a construction that works with any people | The arrangement of property |
| Condorcet, constitutional draft (1793) | A mathematician's constitution with a theory of voting inside | Elections as a measuring instrument (013d) | Procedure at every level |
| Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861) | Plural voting, proportionality | Analysed in 006 §15.12 | A complete theory of representation |
| Henry George, Progress and Poverty (1879) | One reform — the single tax on land — rebuilds the rest | The same type: one lever; the book sold in millions (033) | A short book for the general reader |
From the same list of 20.09 but already within the last hundred years: Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 3 (1979) — a model constitution by an economist; Posner and Weyl, Radical Markets (2018) — 036 §85; Hanson, futarchy — 040b; Van Parijs, basic income — 014.
3. The last hundred years: one norm that rebuilds a system¶
| Work | One lever | What is shared with the protocol | What they have and we do not |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) | Assign the right — the parties will bargain their way to the efficient outcome | The protocol assigns the right of non-turnout and gives it a price | A theorem with conditions of applicability. Ours are not written out |
| Vickrey (1961) → Hurwicz, Maskin, Myerson (2007) | A mechanism in which truth pays better than a lie | The stake is revealed by an act, not by a poll (013) | A proven theorem. We had a statement in words — closed in 013f |
| Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962) | Rules are chosen in advance; the constitutional level is separated from the political | Two levels of decision (048g §6b) | A formal separation of the levels as an article |
| Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965) | A large group does not act without a selective incentive | The dividend is a selective incentive for the largest group (015c §7b) | A quantitative model of group size |
| Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (1968) → emissions trading | Fix the quantity and the price floats; or fix the price and the quantity floats | The protocol fixes the price (D) and lets the quantity (the exit share) go | The second instrument: fix a target exit share and find the sum by clearing |
| Hammond, the Alaska dividend (1976–82) | One payment to everyone from a fund by a formula | 014: one-hundred-per-cent take-up, forty years of data; 14.3b — the 2016 veto and its price | A fund as separate property outside the budget, with constitutional status |
| Kydland and Prescott, "Rules Rather than Discretion" (1977) | A rule that ties the hands is worth more than clever discretion | The formula in the law, not a promise (045.7, 036c.3) | A model computing the gain from commitment |
| Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990) | Eight principles under which the users themselves guard the resource | Parallel counting by supporters (048i) and cheap courts (048j) | Graduated sanctions and nested levels (municipality → region → country) |
| Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge (2008) | The default option decides more than the choice | Auto-enrolment, reversibility (036) | No default is set: what happens to the person who chose nothing |
| Nakamoto, "Bitcoin" (2008) | Honesty pays better than attack; a double spend is visible without a trusted party | A ballot in the name of someone who took the sum is a double spend (048f, 001c §3) | Nine pages. A protocol that changed an industry fitted into one document with one formula |
3b. The closest by content: ten projects and where they are closed¶
A second cut of 30.09.2026 — not by level of conception but by content: where participation is paid for or fined, the composition of voters or the weight of the vote is changed. Three were already in the repository in fragments and are gathered into chapters; seven were absent and were analysed one by one.
| Project or idea | What they had and we did not | Where closed |
|---|---|---|
| Compulsory voting, Australia (1924) | a hundred years of recording non-voters; the same lever with the opposite sign | 023c |
| Democracy vouchers, Seattle (2015–17) | a referendum won and a court case won | 023d |
| Deliberation and assemblies (Fishkin, Ireland) | a measured effect on the quality of decisions | 023e |
| The theorem of profitable abstention (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996) | a proven theorem; the protocol is wider — by horizon, not by knowledge | 013f §1b |
| Abstention buying (Cox and Kousser, 1981; Nichter, 2008) | the secret ballot itself moved the market to buying abstention: non-turnout is verifiable, the choice is not | 048h §5 |
| The voter lottery, Arizona (2006) | the only referendum on money at elections — lost; the taboo lifted by practice in twenty years | 023f |
| Field experiments paying for turnout (Panagopoulos, 2013) | a threshold of sensitivity to the sum | 023f §4 |
| Vote markets (Hasen, 2000; Freiman, 2014) | three classes of objection — equality, efficiency, inalienability | 029.4 |
| Storable votes (Casella), Demeny voting | another currency of compensation — weight instead of money | not our question: a method, and the protocol gives the right, not the methods (048k §3); age — 016 §25 |
| Voucher privatisation (1992–94) | a whole country's lesson about a one-off transferable share | not needed: "privatisation was two generations ago, nobody remembers it, and everyone likes the word 'dividends'" (033c §9d) |
4. How the protocol differs from all of them¶
Almost every work describes what the arrangement should be and leaves open who will make it so and why. The protocol analyses the path itself: who raises the subject and what the first mover gets; why silence is impossible; what rollback looks like and who stands guard (048g); what each opponent does and why he loses (001c). The Federalist comes closest, but it defended a text already written. The second feature is one lever for everything: from a single payment follow the composition of the voters, the count, the rolls, the levies and the rollback.
5. The roadmap: what remains to be written¶
State as of 30.09.2026. The first six rows are the list of 20.09; the last three appeared in the revision of 29.09.
| # | Gap | State | Where |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A text that can be adopted. The Federalist had a constitution; our norms are scattered across chapters | The discrepancies were decided by the architect on 30.09.2026 (048k §3); the text was written on 01.10.2026: terms, preamble, 16 articles, an annex of country settings; what remains are the thresholds of Articles 10–11 (awaiting the pilot) and review by a country's lawyer | 048k, 048m |
| 2 | A formal model. Buchanan, Vickrey, Posner have mathematics | Closed in the part that can be closed without a referee: a setting, four theorems, two assumptions | 013f |
| 3 | Pilot data. Alaska has forty years | Open. A courtyard experiment is proposed: 500–1,000 residents, a live fund, real money against a weighted vote on a real question of the courtyard — instead of buying opinions | — |
| 4 | Beyond elections: courts, minority rights, the security forces | Closed as a design decision | 048j, 013e §5, 048d |
| 5 | A short book. Progress and Poverty was read by workers | Open; the architect's decision. The seed is 001b | — |
| 6 | Criticism not written by us | Half closed: three letters from Tsikhanouskaya's Office (057b), line-by-line analyses of outside analysts (056f); no commissioned external review; a request for an external review has been sent by the architect, no reply as of 01.10.2026. The architect's rule for the meantime: "while there is no external audit, we accumulate and structure what we can find on the internet" — open sources are analysed and filed by chapter. On 01.10.2026 a cold-reader audit was run: two independent AI readers, thirty-seven findings, five unanswered questions (040m) | 057b, 056f |
| 7 | The seat formula. The protocol counts votes, not mandates (039: 52.7 % of votes → 68 % of seats) | Closed by the decision of 30.09.2026: "we do not change the voting system before adoption" — mandates are counted as today | 039, 048k §3 |
| 8 | Showing the number to people: the one-year change next to the three-year base | Handed to economists and sociologists (decision of 28.09); the charter is not to be amended until then | 039 |
| 9 | The charter in 049 holds "K = 1 %", chapters 001 and 055c hold "any value that gives the result" | Closed: the size is set as a percentage of the median, decided by debate and referendum (048k §3); 049 and 002 carry an amendment note | 048k |
6. Three constructive additions from the table in §3¶
- The fork "price or quantity" (Dales). Today the protocol fixes the sum and observes the exit share. The reverse variant is possible: write down a target exit share and announce the sum by clearing. This is a direct answer to the position "the dividend is whatever gives the result": not to tune K but to set the result and let the sum converge. A section computing both schemes is needed.
- The default (Thaler). One article of the charter: the status of the person who chose nothing. The assistant's recommendation is A by default: the right is kept, the money is not received, the record stays "empty" and falls into the zone of control (001c §3).
- The fund as property (Alaska). A separate fund outside the budget — against the argument "there is no money this year"; the conclusion from the 2016 veto (014 §14.3b), which the repository does not yet draw.
The architect's decisions of 30.09.2026 on these three. The fork "price or quantity" and "fund or budget" are methods, and the protocol gives the right to a payment, not the methods: both questions go to experts. The default is decided: the person who chose nothing keeps his vote, he is the controller, and his money waits for him until the next election (048k §3).
And two reinforcements: build the formal model as Vickrey and Myerson did, with conditions of applicability after Coase (013f); fit the single charter into nine pages, as Nakamoto did.
7. Weak point¶
The selection of the ten works is the assistant's: Rawls (the veil of ignorance, 1971) and Hirschman (1970) are not in it, the first as a non-mechanism, the second as the centre of 036c; a dispute over the list is legitimate. The roadmap shows the state on one date and goes stale with every item closed; it must be checked against 048k and the changelog, not the other way round. 🟡
Related: 006 (the gallery) · 013.12 (the pantheon of incentive machines) · 013f (the formal statement) · 036 §85 (ten reforms) · 040j (Kant) · 040k (Strauss and Howe) · 048k (the inventory of norms) · 014 (Alaska) · 001c (the forks)