The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.

The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.

AB-EXIT in One Chapter: the Essence and All the Important Logic¶

Chapter: 01 — Introduction and the Core Formula File: 01_001b · v1 · 17 September 2026 Purpose: synthesis. The repository has grown to a hundred sections; this chapter is a map of meanings, not a retelling: every thesis in one or two sentences and a pointer to where it is proven, stress-tested, or honestly named weak. Read first; everything else is evidence.

An early-draft layer (note of 01.10.2026 after audit 040m). Five refinements to this chapter. The formula is written as a percentage of the median, D = p × M; each level of government has its own median; "automatic crediting" means automatic entry in the register, while the payment is chosen by the person (§7). Choice B is not published by name but is not specially concealed (§1). "Reversible" means: at the next election; within one election choice B is final (§0). "1–2 % of the budget" was computed at a small percentage (§8). "The zone of real victory" and "a x3 vote" are an estimate and arithmetic, not a promise and not a multiplier (§9). The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.

0. In one sentence¶

Before every election every citizen has two buttons. A — "I vote": the vote stays, and it weighs more because some people have left. B — "I take the money": the citizen officially, voluntarily and reversibly exits the election for one cycle and receives a dividend from the state, automatically, by a formula that cannot be touched without a new referendum. After a cycle — the choice anew. That is all. The rest is consequences.

1. The fork¶

The first fork — before A/B. Today a person has two free options: vote or silently stay away. The payment makes silent abstention dominated: staying away and taking nothing is lawful but worse than both buttons at once, so almost everyone takes part — with a vote or with a record at the treasury. Whoever takes the money does not drop out but controls his cancelled vote: a ballot in his name is a double spend. Whoever did nothing is an anomaly and a zone of special control: that is where the raw material for stuffing lies (001c §3, 048i §5b, 056e §3).
The formula. D = M × 1.5 × K, where M is the median wage from an independent federal source, and K is not a dogma: the sum must be desirable for those who have no wish to vote (working measure: for 40–50% of the population; 1% is a starting illustration, 001). Any student can recompute the sum; not one parameter is controlled by the power for which the election is held (001, 048b, 048f.5).
Once per cycle, not monthly. A lump sum is an event remembered to the cent; its reduction flares in the same interface where the political decision is taken. A monthly drift into UBI is the model's error, not the protocol's (033c.5, 020).
Reversible. The right returns automatically; the person has not sold his citizenship, he has leased his vote for a cycle (043 §75.5, 015b.5).
Private by default, open by choice. The A/B status is seen by the person and the treasury (048i.5b); disclosing it is a right, not a duty. Against a boss openness is stronger than secrecy: "yes, I took the money — so what? If you want me to vote for you, pay the same" — blackmail turns into farce (033c.4, 056d.4). Against pressure from one's own — a union, a community — secrecy is stronger: the leader can order but cannot check (018 §31.3).
They sell, we do not buy. The initiative is the citizen's; the state merely posts a public offer. One word changes everything: "the system buys" leaves the person a cog, "I sell" gives him subjectivity and kills grievance culture (033c.1).

2. What actually changes¶

We change who decides — the rest is consequences. For a century reformers have begged the dependent voter to approve long-term development; he will not. The protocol does not persuade — it takes him out of the loop without hurting him financially (033c.6, 059b.4).
A separating equilibrium. One ballot for all gives pooling: the smart and the indifferent merge into a grey mass where the administrative resource wins. A menu of contracts makes the types separate themselves (056e.2, 059c.3).
1/N → 1/(N − M). The value of a vote grows as people exit; with half gone — double, with two thirds gone — triple (hence "x3"), with 90 % gone — tenfold. This is not a trick inside the old choice function but a replacement of the function itself (015c.2, 056e.3).
A phase transition, not a deal. The dividend is not the price of a vote but activation energy: the one who took the money drops out of the choice of managers for this cycle, becomes a line on the balance sheet, and the state no longer needs his vote; he remains a founder and votes in referendums on the rules (040d.3, 033c.2, 048g.6b).
The first fair, voluntary and reversible market census in history. All censuses of the past were built from above; here the filter is from below: the citizen himself judges whether influence matters more to him than a concrete sum (043 §75, 033c.8).

3. Why it works on people, not on angels¶

Greed against stupidity. Populism wins because believing a sweet lie is free. The protocol puts a second vice in the populist's path: a bird in the hand (033c.7).
The poor are not stupid. Refusing money is no sign of intelligence, taking it no sign of stupidity; it is rational play under the short horizon of poverty. For a benefit recipient a lump sum is weeks of income, and he counts it more precisely than an expert (040d.4, 040c.1.5, 019b).
Revealed preference instead of a poll. The stated reason and the perceived stake are different things; the protocol measures the second. Brexit: 49 % of Leave named sovereignty, but 69 % thought "there isn't much in it" (055d.8, 059d.4).
The price of a vote returns to the booth. To vote for a populist you must give up D; shouting "take and divide" for free is possible, paying for it from your pocket is not (059d.4).

4. The thermostat: why the system does not freeze¶

The social thermostat. Life gets worse — the mass returns with a vote that now weighs more and fires the managers; it gets better — the mass leaves again. The Check Engine signal: passengers cannot repair the engine but unerringly notice the breakdown (§13.9, 040b.2).
The number is a comprehensible but crude sensor. The size of the dividend is valuable because it is single, arrives personally and is understood by everyone; as an indicator it is imprecise, but better than none. The real sensor is the share returning with their votes; for those for whom one number is not enough, the candidates will bring the rest in the debates (040b.2b).
The trust barometer. The share refusing the dividend is the second indicator; countries are comparable only by the pair "D + share of A" (§13.11, 040b.5).
Yin-yang. Decay runs both ways: an amplified vote is expensive property, its owner starts trading it until the other shareholders unite against him; stability is not the absence of struggle but its flow from state to state (015b.2; at the scale of one household — 019e.5b).
A repeated game. Elections today are one-shot, where cheating is rational for the incumbent; the protocol satisfies all four of Axelrod's conditions for cooperation: a long shadow of the future, a legible move (the number), cheap retaliation (a tick instead of a revolution), simplicity (013b.3).
The scoreboard as interlingua. A number needs no translation and no belief — it is received; countries are compared by one figure, and a "special path" stops explaining poverty (040b.4).

5. Who remains and why they can be trusted with more¶

Not the wise, but a dearer principal. Those remain who have a reason in this cycle: the wronged and the burned, the value-based (hold norms), the status-based; the contented go to the money and return when contentment ends. These are states, not types (015c.7a, 004 §4.3b). They err, but their choice is dearer, and power is no longer taken with noise (015c.7, 040b.3).
The elite is a national team, not a caste. Children of the passive enter the elite; engineers compete for the right to prove they are smarter; the scoreboard is the size of the dividend; the bench is the majority (040b.3).
Avatars die out, engineers survive. The old system rewards hypnosis, not intellect; an auditor cannot be hypnotised with a smile (059, 034b.7).
The politician of the new world. Not an "ideologue of evolution" but a manager who can be trusted with a long cycle: a value frame for the ideologues plus a verifiable trajectory for the pragmatists (015c.8, 015).
A father who can be fired. The protocol gives democracy the figure of a caring leader without tyranny: a lion with a collar whose remote is in everyone's pocket (034b.8).

6. Who is against and who loses¶

The losers are few, and they are not the people. Direct losers — 3–7 % of the population; the hard core (money + power + profession) — 1.5–3 %: mobilisation machines, GOTV, consultants, polarisation media, populists living on the apathetic (013c.4).
Against — 10–16 % with a clear formula: those who need neither money nor weight; the principled "the vote is sacred"; those who do not believe the mechanism (013c.5).
"The vote is sacred" misses. Nobody takes the vote away; it is amplified for those who value it above the sum; under that slogan people defend the right of low-value participation to dilute high-value participation (037b.2, 040d).
One move against all objections. Everyone has already accepted free mass non-attendance as the norm; explain what precisely in compensation makes the same non-attendance inadmissible. Seven AIs and hundreds of rounds gave no clean answer (037, 037b, 043 §76).
Masks. Nobody will say the truth ("we lose our base and budgets"); they will say "vote buying", "a blow to the poor", "fiscal irresponsibility", "a dangerous precedent" (039, 059f.4).

7. Defending the construction¶

Five statute parameters: the source — only the federal median; the formula strictly D = M × 1.5 × K; 100 % automatic crediting; the choice anew at every election; no approvals or vetoes. Changing any one — a new referendum (059e.3, 042).
Two levels of decision. The rules of the game — adoption, repeal, parameters — are changed by all citizens at a referendum, including those who took the money; managers are chosen by those who stayed. The protocol can be repealed only by persuading the majority to vote against its own payment, and the governing cohort cannot touch the dividend (048g.6b).
Four substitutions to expect: the source switched to budget revenue, the source switched to surveys, a composite index, a barrier at the exit (059e.3).
The four-agency rule and the 10 % rule against data sabotage (048b).
Double entry instead of observers. [dividend budget] = [number of B] × D; paint turnout — the treasury does not reconcile; the audit is an SMS from the bank (048f).
Open source, multisignature, the right to fork — so that the protocol's carrier does not himself become a digital autocrat (057c.6).
How simplicity gets killed — and how to defend it: blur the sum, blur the receipt, tie it to a threat, turn it into morality, make it technical (040c).

8. Economics¶

The dividend costs 1–2 % of the budget against ~20 % on "maintaining loyalty" through non-working programmes (055b.8, 045).
x10, not savings on paperclips. The money for the dividend comes not from cutting officials but from the multiplier: when the controlling stake is with the motivated, the quality of decisions grows not by 15 % but by an order of magnitude (059c.3, 048). The direction here is not an assumption but a structural argument: a city receives its money compulsorily and still reaches bankruptcy, while a firm with the same turnover bears a cost of goods, can lose its customer any day and lives on profit — a difference of incentives, not of talent (the pizzeria test: 018.40–41, 019.59.7; 015b.6b). What is unmeasured is the size: "x10" is an image of the order; the repository's own cautious estimate is +2–5 % of GDP as a level effect (019.59.5, 045), and "doubling in five years" in the dialogues is an "if" scenario (048e.8). How much exactly is a task for economists and a pilot. Separate from this is the fast effect of subtraction: repealing levies and fictitious control takes neither money nor competence and is visible to a person right after the first election (019c).
A change of sign, not +5 %. The state's utility U = B − C is negative for many; the protocol claims a crossing of zero — from state-as-obstacle to state-as-instrument (015c.3).
The term "state money" dies. The budget becomes a P&L, the dividend a shareholder's share, tax a fee for infrastructure (034b.6).
Park benches. Quality grows not from appeals but from a construction in which a bad state is unprofitable for someone; the current system makes benches for mobilisation, the protocol for those who answer for the choice (015c.6).

9. Adoption¶

From below, by referendum. Citizen initiative, the municipal level, charter cities — not parliament's mercy (045, 049, 050–052).
The pre-launch referendum is a different game. After launch almost everyone has something to take; before launch it is a collective action with a threshold, where a narrow core with a concentrated stake strikes at six chokepoints: wording, signatures, frame, turnout, courts, implementation (013c).
The rocket matters more than the pilot. An underdog with the single fork "money or a x3 vote" moves from "loud third" into the zone of real victory; any attack advertises the formula (059e, 059f, 040c.1).
The first 48 hours: the first tranche within a day, a "digital guillotine" of three procedures, the country's live P&L from a phone (055b.8).
The challenge as a mini-referendum: every clip is a choice made in public (052).
Give it away free. A fundamental-level protocol is not sold as SaaS; the standard is created by whoever releases the core into open access. The window is a year; what is worth guarding is not the brand but simplicity (059b.7, 040c.6–7).

10. Transition under autocracy¶

The army is a cross-section of the people. An order to shoot at those demanding the dividend is an order to shoot at one's own income; election day becomes "payday", which the forces guard like a cash desk (048d).
The dictator's paradox. The poorer and simpler he made the people, the clearer and more desirable the protocol (048d.4).
Golden parachute or sainthood. The elite gets a dominant strategy; fear as an instrument of power is zeroed (048d.6, 057c.4).
The export of truth. "Why do they have it and we don't" is a question at the level of shop prices; nobody can be jailed for it; dictatorships fear not tanks but comparison (048e).
The price of coercion. The order "go and vote" costs 30 minutes; the order "don't take the money" costs a month's wage; the boss climbs into the pocket, and blackmail breaks (056d.4).

11. Irreversibility¶

After the first working cycle, retention 85–90 %; for rollback at a referendum 7–12 % — voting for repeal means voting against one's own prize; in durability the protocol is closer to Social Security and the Alaska PFD than to procedural reforms. The main risk is not repeal but quiet spoilage of the formula (30–40 %), and the whole answer to it is protecting the parameters, not speeches about irreversibility (048g, 036.85.7). After launch the language of the dispute itself changes: not "why don't you vote" but "why do you vote for free" — and that begins before the law, as soon as the fork is spoken aloud (048g.6).

12. What the protocol does not promise¶

An honest list from the sections' "weak points", collected in one place:

It does not make voters wiser: refusing money proves motivation, not competence (015c.9, 040c.3).
It does not abolish populism — it deprives it of an audience; the value-driven voter with a strong identity stays with x3 (055d.5).
It is designed for electing managers; a one-off constitutional referendum outside the protocol remains a one-way door (055d.8, 013b.3).
The dividend is small compared with the losses from bad policy: anger is removed by changing who decides, not by the cheque (055d.9).
The first cycle before x10 must be financed in advance; household coercion is not solved by the protocol, though family voting gets a price for the first time (019e.5b); a narrow pool of A in a municipality is vulnerable to a cartel (039b.3, 015b.8).
"A x3 vote" is not a multiplier in the count but the floating arithmetic 1/(1 − the share who exited): every ballot counts as one (033c.9b). The legal wall is not vote weight but payment for non-participation: the US federal contour is closed by §597 (059b.8, 049).
The effect figures are model projections; a baseline appears only with a pilot (037b.8). In the dialogues the sums "1,000–1,500 euros" are the model's drift; by the formula, for France ≈ 390 euros, for Britain ≈ £465, for the US ≈ $780 (055d.4).

12b. What belongs to the protocol's logic and what to parameters¶

The architect's clarification on the question of what choice B covers with several levels of elections and who pays: "the budget always pays. The logic is simple: refused the election — received the money. The sums and budget shares should be entrusted to economists, and they do not belong to the logic of the protocol itself; these are simply solvable tasks, not a matter for deep discussion of the concept." Hence a boundary by which any objection is worth sorting.

The protocol's logic: discussed as a concept	Parameters: tasks for economists and lawyers
Two buttons, voluntary, reversible, once per cycle	The size of K and the resulting sum in a territory (033c.9c)
Refused the election — received the money; the budget pays, automatically and independently of the sitting government's will	From which budget or fund, under which line, on what schedule; returnability of the payment
Vote weight is the arithmetic of those who stay, not a multiplier (033c.9b)	How the median is computed and who publishes it (048b)
Everyone changes the rules, those who stay choose managers (048g.6b)	How federal, regional and local elections and primaries are combined
Five statute parameters outside ordinary politics (059e.3)	Ballot wording and the legal construction in a given jurisdiction (049)
Three channels: money, an open verifiable vote, a secret ballot (048i)	The technique of tokens, the register and the payment

A clarification to the row on the payment. The README states the principle of "full autonomy": the payment is automatic, and the sitting government cannot control it. The architect: "the payment is automatic once a person has chosen it, and it is non-returnable; returnability can be thought through more carefully with lawyers later — these are details." The boundary runs as follows: automaticity and independence from the government are the protocol's logic (if the payment can be delayed, cut or switched off at the government's discretion, choice B ceases to be reliable and the whole mechanism turns into an ordinary handout); non-returnability is the working default, open to lawyers; where the money physically comes from — a budget line or a separate fund — is a parameter.

An objection to the right-hand column is not an objection to the protocol: it means "this has to be calculated", not "this does not work". One exception worth remembering in the calculations: with several elections per cycle the principle "refusal — payment" multiplies the annual cost by their number; this is a question for economists, but it affects the estimate "1–2 % of the budget".

13. Three lines to leave with¶

Either money, or a heavier vote. · We change who decides — the rest is consequences. · Complicated is where they steal; honest is where it is simple.

14. Weak point of the chapter¶

A synthesis inherits all the weaknesses of its sources and adds its own: compressing into one sentence erases the caveats on which the sections' honesty rests. This chapter is a map, and any dispute must be conducted by the links, not by it. 🟡

Related: 001 (formula) · 033b (short manifesto) · 033c (language of the protocol) · 013, 013b, 013c (game theory) · 015b, 015c (spiral, change of sign) · 040b (scoreboard) · 042, 048b, 048f, 048g (defence, rollback) · 048d, 048e (autocracy) · 045, 052, 059e, 059f (adoption) · 037, 037b, 043 (AI stress tests) · 055d (Brexit) · qa/ (question base)