The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
40ay. Ilya Somin: Democracy and Political Ignorance — Five Arguments: Rational Ignorance, Cues Do Not Work, Foot Voting, the Stayers Are Just as Ignorant, Smaller Government¶
Chapter: 06 — The Structural Hypocrisy of Criticism and the Arsenal of the Elites File: 06_040ay · v1 · 16 October 2026 Source: the architect's assignment of 16 October 2026 ("Put them all in the repo"). Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter (2013, 2nd ed. 2016); Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom (2020). An ally of Dalton's rank (040aj) and a bridge to the Ayn Rand Institute (040aj §7): his cure for ignorance is "foot voting" instead of ballot-box voting, and the protocol is foot voting inside the ballot box. Written without a move by the architect.
How to read. Somin shows that the voter is rationally ignorant: one vote does not decide, so knowing does not pay. The chapter shows that the protocol is the only known way to put foot voting inside the ballot box itself: the choice "take or stay" decides personally for the chooser, and about it ignorance does not pay.
0. What he claims¶
Most voters do not know basic facts about politics — and this is rational: the probability of deciding the outcome is negligible, the cost of knowing is real. Cues — the party label, retrospection, expert opinion — work worse than is assumed and often lead into the same error. The cure is not to educate the voter but to give him a choice where his decision really decides: foot voting — moving between jurisdictions, choice in the private sector, federalism. The foot voter gathers information because a mistake costs him personally. Hence: smaller government and more decisions at a level one can leave.
1. Rational ignorance: knowing does not pay while the vote does not decide — the protocol does not change the probability of deciding¶
Argument. The one who stays is still one of millions; his vote still does not decide; no incentive to know has been added.
Answer. The protocol adds a second choice where the decision always decides, and personally: take or stay. About one's own cheque ignorance pays nobody — and this is the first political question a rational voter is obliged to answer. Then the chain of 040an §3 works: to decide "take or not" one must estimate what the others will do and what the government is worth — and that is a demand for knowledge (040u item 3), created not by duty but by price. The probability of deciding also rises for the one who stays: fewer votes, each ×2.
Residual. None.
2. Cues do not work: the label, retrospection and experts lead into the same error — those who stay will judge by the same cues¶
Argument. Self-selection does not make cues better; those who stay are the same people with the same labels.
Answer. Cues break where they are cheaper than knowledge; the protocol changes exactly the price of the cue. The brought-in voter votes by the campaign's cue — and leaves. The one who stays refused money for a vote and has a stake a cue cannot justify (040at §1: the leaving is the proof of counting by substance). Retrospection among those who stay is longer than a cycle (040at §2). And the protocol has a cue no other system has: the share of takers — an external indicator of the government that cannot be drawn (013g §3b).
Residual. None.
3. Foot voting is better than ballot-box voting — the cure is federalism and exit, not a payment¶
Argument. The real cure is the ability to leave for another jurisdiction; the payment keeps the person in the same one.
Answer. The protocol is his own cure carried inside the booth. Few can leave for another state, and dearly; everyone can take the payment, for free, and it is an exit with the same properties: the decision is personal, the consequences personal, information pays. The protocol's name is literal — exit (013 §13.9, Hirschman). Somin looks for the exit outside politics; the protocol makes exit a political act with a price and a count. And federalism is compatible with the protocol: the pilot is a city (048l), the percentage is each jurisdiction's own (048m art. 8).
Residual. None.
4. Those who stay are just as ignorant: self-selection by interest is not selection by knowledge¶
Argument. To be interested and to know are different things; those who stay are the interested, not the knowing.
Answer. True, and the protocol does not promise the knowing — it promises the interested with a price (036e §6, Mirrlees). The difference from today's hall is not in the volume of knowledge but in its cost: today nobody needs the voter's knowledge; under the protocol the voter himself pays for it — by refusing D. His own model: knowledge is bought when it pays. For the one who stays it pays ×2.
Residual. Yes: the knowledge level of those who stay is a pilot measurement; the protocol predicts a rise in the demand for knowledge, not a rise in knowledge (040u item 3).
5. Smaller government is smarter; the protocol leaves government large¶
Argument. If the state decides less, ignorance costs less; the protocol shrinks nothing.
Answer. The protocol is not about the size of the state but about the price of judging it. Somin reduces the damage of ignorance by narrowing the subject; the protocol reduces it by making the judgement of the government personal and paid. The two cures do not exclude each other, but the second needs no agreement about the size of the state — and so passes a referendum where the first never will (040aw §3).
Residual. None.
6. What he gives the protocol¶
An exact name for the mechanism — foot voting inside the booth. The formula of the incentive: knowledge is bought when a mistake costs personally; the protocol makes the first political mistake personal. An ally from the side where the protocol is least expected — the libertarians, through the bridge to the Ayn Rand Institute (040aj §7).
Summary¶
| Argument | What is true | Answer | What remains |
|---|---|---|---|
| rational ignorance | yes | the choice "take or stay" decides personally; demand for knowledge from price, not duty | — |
| cues do not work | yes, where a cue is cheaper than knowledge | the brought-in leaves with the cue; the one who stays has a stake; the share of takers is an indicator that cannot be drawn | — |
| foot voting | yes | the protocol is the same cure inside the booth; the exit is free and open to everyone | — |
| the stayers are ignorant | yes, self-selection is not by knowledge | knowledge pays ×2; the protocol promises demand, not knowledge | the knowledge level — a pilot measurement |
| smaller government | not necessarily | the protocol is about the price of judging, not size; it passes a referendum where his prescription does not | — |
Weak point¶
A reconstruction from two books. One residual — the knowledge of those who stay — is a measurement. Written without a move by the architect.
Related: 040aj §7 · 040an §3 · 040at · 040u item 3 · 040aw §3 · 036e §6 · 040d · 013 §13.9 · 013g §3b · 048m art. 8 · 048l