The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
Geopolitics and Country Specifics¶
Where it applies, where it does not, and what changes from country to country. General rules of the base — in the introduction.
How to read this chapter (note of 02.10.2026). The text contains wording that is easy to misread: "trust" and "escrow" are the earlier wording: the budget pays under law. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.
Q-GEO-001 · Why is the launch planned in the US and not somewhere easier?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: country experts, journalists Source in the book: §45, items 68.2–68.7, §46 "Oregon initiative", §47 "State-by-state" Related: Q-LEG-003, Q-GEO-003
Answer. Because the US has a rare combination: the citizen initiative at state level, by which the mechanism is introduced without the consent of the sitting legislature, plus a tradition of state competence in electoral law (U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton), plus precedents for changing election law by initiative and precedents of anchor campaign funding. §47 gives a map of the states where the route passes without blockage; Oregon is worked out operationally.
Weak point of the answer. "Easier" and "more reliable" are different criteria. A small country would give a faster pilot, but the result would be easier to write off to its size. The US is chosen for the persuasiveness of the result, not the ease of launch — and that is knowingly the more expensive path.
Q-GEO-002 · Will AB-EXIT work in an authoritarian country?¶
Status: 🔁 contested Who asks: diplomats, country specialists, the Russian and post-Soviet audience Source in the book: §56 "Russia: an adoption scenario under the present regime", §9 "A vaccine against 10 types of tyrant" Related: Q-IMP-004, Q-GEO-003, Q-GEO-005
Answer. §56 answers this in detail and with an unexpected move: it does not ask whether society wants it, but asks — what problem of the authorities does AB-EXIT solve. The answer: the system's main electoral technology, "drying out the turnout", is today expensive and dirty (administrative resources, herding state employees, manipulation, scandals). From the office AB-EXIT looks like a legalised, self-financing, voluntary drying-out of turnout with a receipt — cheaper than administrative resources and with an international showcase. Hence a three-stroke scenario: the interest of the summit, the interest of the middle storey of the vertical (which needs rules more than favour) and the dissolution of the loyalist majority through the spiral of silence.
Weak point of the answer. The scenario explains why a regime might adopt it — but does not remove the question of whether the mechanism stays the same after adoption. It requires an independent trust, honest income statistics and a court ready to defend the referendum text; where none of the three exists, AB-EXIT risks remaining only a drying-out of turnout, without the second half — the strengthening of the remaining votes. §56 names five irreversibilities on which that risk breaks, but they are reasoning so far, not observation.
Q-GEO-003 · What carries over to another country, and what has to be invented afresh?¶
Status: 🟡 open Who asks: everyone fitting the protocol to their own jurisdiction Source in the book: Part V — §53–57, all drafts Related: Q-ECO-002, Q-IMP-001, Q-GEO-002
Answer. The book's structure answers architecturally: Parts I–III are declared universal (formula, philosophy, theory, electoral dynamics, answers to criticism), Part IV is US specifics, Part V is adaptations. That is, what carries over is the principle, and three things are tuned: the source of income data, the legal route of introduction and the source that fills the trust.
Weak point of the answer. The boundary between "universal" and "American" is drawn declaratively. In fact W-2 already sits in Part I (Q-ECO-002) — American specifics leak into the universal layer. Until at least one genuine country section is written, the universality of Parts I–III remains untested.
Q-GEO-004 · Moldova is the idea's birthplace. Why is it not the first candidate?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: the Moldovan audience, the local press Source in the book: §53 "Moldova: the opportunity" Related: Q-GEO-001, Q-IMP-004
Answer. The section is written and rests on the empirics of the elections of 28 September 2025, BNS statistics and the IFES / Recorded Future reports. Moldova is not "not the first candidate" but a different type of candidate: a small country where a pilot is genuinely feasible and where the effect is visible fast, but where the result is easier to write off to size. The US is chosen for the persuasiveness of the result (Q-GEO-001), Moldova for its speed.
Weak point of the answer. The very feature that makes Moldova convenient for a pilot makes it vulnerable: high exposure to external interference in elections. A mechanism that lawfully lowers turnout requires especially strict safeguards in such a country — otherwise it strengthens exactly the attack it is meant to defend against (Q-IMP-004).