The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
Law and the Constitution¶
Questions about the legality of AB-EXIT, the franchise and precedents. General rules of the base — in the introduction.
An early-draft layer (note of 01.10.2026 after audit 040m). In entry Q-LEG-002 "the choice is reversible" means: at the next election; within one election choice B is final. The exact-answers sheet 1d and the charter 048m are in force.
Q-LEG-001 · Isn't this vote-buying?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: lawyer, journalist, debate opponent — the most frequent objection Source in the book: §29.4 Related: Q-ETH-001, Q-LEG-002
Answer. A category error. Vote-buying is payment for voting for a specific candidate or party: "vote for X — get Y". It is banned because it distorts the expression of the voter's will in favour of one side.
AB-EXIT pays for exiting the process in this cycle. No candidate gains an advantage, because the one who took the dividend votes for nobody. The payment does not direct the choice; it records one already made. Structurally it is closer to a social payment (UBI, a pension, a tax credit) than to bribery.
Weak point of the answer. The neutrality of "for nobody" holds at the level of the mechanism but not at the level of statistics: if exit correlates with income and age, the outflow hits parties asymmetrically. The mechanism is neutral; the consequences are not. This is acknowledged honestly and examined in Q-ELE-002.
Q-LEG-002 · Does AB-EXIT deprive citizens of the vote?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: human-rights advocates, academics Source in the book: §29.3 Related: Q-LEG-001, Q-ETH-002
Answer. The right is neither abolished nor forfeited. The choice is reversible: in any following cycle (once every four years) the citizen may return and vote. All other rights — court, protest, speech, petition — remain in full. This is not a qualification system but a system of self-exit with reversibility. The difference between "take away a right" and "grant a right to decline" is basic.
Weak point of the answer. Reversibility once every four years is reversibility with a delay. If a crisis occurs between elections, the citizen who exited has no electoral instrument until the end of the cycle. The argument "he would not have gone anyway" is statistical, not individual.
Q-LEG-003 · Is this legal in the US? What about 52 U.S.C. §10307(c)?¶
Status: 🔁 contested Who asks: American lawyers, campaigns Source in the book: §45, items 68.5–68.6, §49 Related: Q-LEG-004, Q-GEO-001
Answer. The federal ban in §10307(c) is aimed at payment for registering and for voting, that is, for an action in favour of a side. AB-EXIT's position: payment for non-participation does not fall under that ban, and the launch route is state level through a citizen initiative, where electoral law is traditionally within state competence (relying on U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 1995). The target state in development is Oregon.
Weak point of the answer. This is an interpretation, not an established precedent. No court has yet ruled on the construction "paid voluntary exit". §45 records outright that the third round of adversarial testing exposed operational risks, and that LLM assessment of legal questions has a limit. Until a real test in court, the status of the question is contested, not settled.
Q-LEG-004 · What stops the next government from repealing or gutting the mechanism?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: institutional sceptics Source in the book: §42 "The poison pill", §2 Related: Q-ECO-002, Q-GAM-001
Answer. Outright repeal requires a new referendum — the same level of legitimacy as the introduction. The real threat is not repeal but quiet substitution of the code, and §42 lists four ways: substituting general fund revenue for the data source; substituting Census for W-2; dilution through a composite index; killing the automaticity through a barrier on the payment. The defence is hard fixing of the source (W-2 via the SSA), the coefficients and the automaticity in text adopted by referendum. In referendums on the protocol itself all citizens vote, including those who took the dividend: status B is a refusal to choose managers for a cycle, not of the right to decide the rules. So repeal requires a majority to vote against its own payment, and the governing cohort cannot change the parameters (§48g.6b).
Weak point of the answer. The defence is textual. It works exactly as far as a court is willing to defend it and an administration to execute it. Against sabotage by execution ("the money is technically delayed") the text helps little.
Q-LEG-005 · Doesn't this violate the principle of equal votes, "one person — one vote"?¶
Status: ✅ answered (the architect's refinement, 20.09.2026); the legal examination with precedents — 🟡 Who asks: constitutionalists Source in the book: partly §1 (weighting), §45 Related: Q-GAM-002
Answer. No, because no multiplier exists in the count. Every ballot counts as one. "Vote x2/x3" is not a rule of the charter but a description of the arithmetic: if of N voters M have exited for money, each remaining voter decides a share of 1/(N − M), that is, weighs 1/(1 − share exited) times more; the number floats from cycle to cycle and from territory to territory (§33c.9b). The weight is not assigned by the state by an attribute of the person but arises from how many people remain — exactly the same effect ordinary abstention produces today: at 50 % turnout every voter who came already weighs twice as much as at full turnout, and nobody counts that a violation of equality. A legal multiplier would moreover be pointless: an identical coefficient for all voters changes not a single share or result.
Weak point of the answer. The arithmetic removes the objection in substance but not in form: Reynolds v. Sims and the "one person, one vote" line concern districting, not the size of the electorate, and that boundary still needs drawing with precedents. Second: while the slogans say "vote x3", an opponent will read it as a multiplier — the formulation must be held ("your vote weighs more because some people exited"). And the philosophical version of the objection remains: equality that requires activation is no longer an uncontested core (§34, blow 3). The real legal wall is not vote weight but payment for non-participation (Q-LEG-003).
Q-LEG-006 · How much is paid, who decides, and what is actually written in the charter?¶
Status: ✅ answered Who asks: lawyers, legislators, authors of the referendum text Source in the book: 048k "Inventory of Norms and Decisions", 049 Related: Q-LEG-002, Q-LEG-004, Q-ECO-001
Answer. There is no sum — there is a percentage of the median income; for a country it turns into a sum, but it must be set as a percentage. The percentage is determined by open debate and a referendum, even with ten options; one may launch with any, and change it no more than once per cycle, by a simple majority. The median and the averaging period are a country setting for economists. Chose the money — received it at once and entered the counter at once; no way back, or there would be collusion. Secrecy is for the ballot, exit is not specially hidden. Everyone who has a vote today is entitled to the money: the voting system is not changed before adoption. Each level of government pays at its own elections. Whoever chose nothing is the controller, his money waits until the next election. The principle: the protocol gives the right to a payment as an incentive, not the methods of arranging it.
Weak point of the answer. Five of the twelve decisions hand the question to experts, and the charter will be short precisely because those answers are not in it; the first critic will call them blanks.