The rule, exactly. Before an election each citizen chooses: to vote — or to take a payment and not vote in that election. The payment is a percentage of the median income, set by referendum; there is no fixed sum. One ballot is one vote, with no multiplier in the count; the vote is amplified only in that each ballot's share grows as others step out. The budget pays under law; a candidate never pays. Only a referendum of all citizens — simple majority, no quorum — introduces, changes or repeals the rule.
The protocol has been introduced nowhere and no pilot has been run: shares, turnout and outcome figures in the chapters are estimates, and the protocol promises nobody an election victory. If a chapter says otherwise, Exact Answers and the Charter are correct. For a candidate: ten questions and ten steps. For a citizen, a mayor, a finance officer, a donor, a journalist, a scholar, a lawyer: answers by role. Everything in force in one file: llms-full.txt.
51. Civil War, a Third Party and the Triangle: AB-EXIT as a Truce¶
Chapter: 09 File version: v1 Date: 2026-06-11 Source: v6.53 §27, §28, §29, §30
Correction of 01.10.2026. "$780", "1.5 %" and "a vote with triple weight" in this chapter are a worked example for the US written before the decisions of 30.09.2026. The current norm: the size of the payment is set as a percentage of the median income and approved by referendum; one ballot is one vote, there is no multiplier ("triple weight" is the arithmetic of a share: the more people exit, the larger the share each ballot cast makes up, equally for everyone who votes); the jurisdiction's budget pays under law, a candidate never pays; only a referendum introduces or changes the rule, an elected body cannot; numbers on election outcomes and words about inevitability in this chapter are estimates and theses, there has been no pilot (1d, 048m).
Correction of 05.10.2026 after a clean Grok test on the 2027 Chicago mayoral election (040m §5i). The count "60 % > 20 %" in this chapter assumes a machine of coercion — brought-in voters who leave for the payment. The American machine is built differently: a union brings a voter with a stake — the contract the mayor will sign — and by the protocol's own logic he does not take the payment. In 2023 Johnson won with turnout in his precincts lower than his rival's (32 % against 39 %), by margin, not by a flood. The protocol subtracts those to whom the outcome is worth less than the cheque, and in Chicago they are at home already. For the US the second lever remains — the return of the burned and the counter (1f §8) — and that count must be made afresh, not carried over from the Hungarian-Russian model.
27.1. Diagnosis: America in a pre-war state¶
72 % of Americans think the country is heading in the wrong direction. 62 % of Democrats consider Republicans a threat to democracy. 58 % of Republicans consider Democrats a threat to democracy. 40 % of the young consider civil war possible within 10 years. 6 January 2021 — the storming of the Capitol. Attempts on politicians' lives. This is not normal politics. This is a pre-war state.
27.2. The mechanism of polarisation: a $26B hate factory¶
Polarisation is not a natural disaster. Polarisation is a PRODUCT, manufactured for $26B a year to mobilise the apathetic. Negative ads ($4.5B), dark money ($1B), robocalls ($500M), GOTV ($2B) — the target audience = the 48 % apathetic who must be FRIGHTENED to get them to the polls. "The other side = monsters! Fascists! Communists! If you don't vote — THEY will destroy everything!"
The apathetic is mobilised not through a programme, not through arguments — through FEAR. Hatred = the cheapest and most effective tool for mobilising low-information voters. Over 20 years a spiral of escalation: 2004 "they're wrong" → 2012 "they're enemies" → 2020 "they want to destroy the country" → 2024 "civil war".
27.3. AB-EXIT kills the hate factory¶
With AB-EXIT the apathetic take $780 and leave. The target audience of negative ads disappears. The party: "The other side = MONSTERS!" The apathetic: "OK. Here's my $780. Bye." The party: "...whom are we going to shout at?"
$26B → $1B. Negative ads are useless (the motivated cannot be frightened; they need facts). Dark money is useless (nobody to show anonymous attacks to). GOTV is useless (the motivated come by themselves). $25B of hatred = evaporated. Because the buyer left = the product is not needed = the factory closed.
27.4. The motivated do not hate¶
Hatred = a tool of IRRATIONAL persuasion. The motivated = RATIONAL. The rational have no need for hatred. A motivated Democrat: "Candidate A will create 5,000 jobs. Here's the calculation." A motivated Republican: "Candidate B will save business $12M. Here's the calculation." Both — with calculations. Both — without hatred. Debate instead of war. Arguments instead of insults. Lawsuits instead of storming the Capitol.
6 January is impossible under AB-EXIT. The crowd at the Capitol = apathetics mobilised by hatred. With AB-EXIT they would have taken $780 and sat at home. The motivated Trumpists (who refused the $780) = rational. The rational do not storm — they sue. AB-EXIT turns a STORMING into a LAWSUIT, VIOLENCE into PROCEDURE, a MOB into LAWYERS.
27.5. The inevitability of a third party — the mathematics¶
Under AB-EXIT the electorate = 100 % motivated. Convinced Democrats: ~20 %. Convinced Republicans: ~20 %. The motivated centre (not attached to a party, votes for results): ~60 %.
60 % > 20 %. A third party is mathematically inevitable. These 60 % are not apathetics, not waverers. These are people who PAID $780 for a vote but are NOT ATTACHED to the letter D or R. They vote for the dividend, for a programme, for a calculation — not for identity. A candidate in the centre: "I'm not D and not R. I'm for a dividend +15 %. Here's my calculation." The 60 %: "A calculation? It adds up. I'm voting."
Andrew Yang and the Forward Party have already shown the demand: 63 % of Americans want a third party (Gallup 2025). Forward's problem: the spoiler effect in a two-party system. AB-EXIT removes the spoiler effect: when the apathetic have left, a third party wins DIRECTLY, not by siphoning votes.
27.6. A triangle is more stable than a line — the physics of politics¶
A two-party system = a LINE. A line = unstable. Swings left-right. "Us vs them." A pendulum. The Capitol riot = the line that swung. This is not a political problem — it is a GEOMETRIC problem.
A triangle = the only polygon that CANNOT be deformed without destruction. A square: press on a corner → a rhombus → collapsed. A pentagon: press → deforms. A triangle: press → STANDS. That is why: bridges = triangular trusses, roofs = triangular rafters, the Eiffel Tower = 18,000 triangles, the pyramids have stood 4,500 years.
A three-party system = a TRIANGLE. Three centres of gravity. None dominates. A+B vs C → a coalition. A+C vs B → another coalition. B+C vs A → a third. Everyone can be in a coalition with everyone. No permanent enemy — changing partners. Everyone is forced to respect everyone, because tomorrow they may be needed as a partner.
Real examples: the USA (2 parties) = maximum polarisation, minimum stability. Germany (3–5 parties) = low polarisation, 75 years of stability. Switzerland (4 parties) = minimum polarisation, maximum stability. The most stable democracies of the world = a triangle or more. Without exception.
27.7. AB-EXIT converts the line into a triangle¶
Without AB-EXIT: 50 % red vs 50 % blue. Zero buffer. Any dispute = war.
With AB-EXIT: 20 % red + 20 % blue + 60 % centre (buffer). 60 % in the centre = civil war impossible. Because war = 50 % vs 50 %. And 20 % vs 20 % with a 60 % buffer = a shout into the void. The reds: "FASCISTS!" The 60 %: "Show the calculation." The blues: "COMMUNISTS!" The 60 %: "Show the calculation." Hatred drowns in the rationality of the centre.
27.8. The chain of discoveries — how we reached this conclusion¶
The triangle conclusion was obtained not speculatively but through a chain of analytical steps:
Step 1 (section 19): a $26B industry for mobilising the apathetic. Negative ads = a PRODUCT for the apathetic. The apathetic = the target audience of hatred.
Step 2: AB-EXIT removes the target audience. No audience = no product = factory closed. $26B → $1B.
Step 3: who remains. 20 % + 20 % convinced + 60 % motivated centre. The 60 % are not attached to a party. They vote for results.
Step 4: 60 % > 20 %. A third party is mathematically inevitable. (Note of 02.10.2026: this is the chapter's thesis under the shares it assumes, not a theorem; the shares are estimates, and there has been no pilot.) Not through the spoiler effect but through direct victory.
Step 5: two-party = a line = unstable. Three-party = a triangle = stable. Physics confirms: a triangle cannot be deformed. Germany and Switzerland confirm: multi-party = stability.
Step 6: AB-EXIT = the transfer of politics from linear geometry to triangular. Not a metaphor — LITERALLY. The universe prefers threes (3 dimensions, 3 states of matter, 3 branches of government). AB-EXIT lets politics stop resisting physics.
27.9. AB-EXIT = a truce in the civil war¶
AB-EXIT is not merely an electoral reform. AB-EXIT = a TRUCE. $780 = a demilitarised zone for the 50 % of the population who officially, legally, with money in the account say: "I don't care about your war. Give me $780 and sort it out yourselves." The armies of both sides = halved. A smaller army = less war = closer to peace.
AB-EXIT does not resolve ideological disagreements. Democrats and Republicans will continue to disagree. But AB-EXIT deprives them of their WEAPON (hatred), their SOLDIERS (the apathetic) and their PRETEXT (mobilisation by fear). The remaining 20 % vs 20 % with a 60 % buffer = DEBATE, not WAR. Because war needs armies. And debate needs arguments. AB-EXIT demobilises the armies and forces both sides back to arguments.
28.1. Five causes of rejection¶
When an ordinary person first hears of AB-EXIT, he says "nonsense" not because the idea is bad — but because the explanation is bad. Five barriers:
Too complex. "A protocol of compensated electoral abstention with the formula D = W2_M × 1.5 × 1 %..." A person does not buy a DRILL — he buys a HOLE IN THE WALL. We explain HOW it works instead of WHY he needs it.
Too abstract. "Protocol", "mechanism", "revealed preference", "electoral abstention" — an ordinary person does not know these words and does not want to. He knows: money, vote, mayor, taxes, road, school.
Too good to be true. "$780 for what I don't do anyway?" The reflex: "The Nigerian prince also promised $10M." A defence mechanism against fraud. A person does not believe in free money because he has been cheated.
The sacredness of the vote. "People DIED for the right to vote! And you want to PAY for not voting?!" An emotional reaction, not a rational one. Impossible to dissuade with a rational argument, because emotion is stronger than logic.
Authority bias. "Who are you? If it were good — Harvard would have proposed it." The idea is judged not by quality but by source. A guy from Moldova proposing to change American elections = automatic rejection.
28.2. Six rules of communication¶
Rule 1: Start with the PAIN, not the solution. Wrong: "AB-EXIT is a protocol of compensated electoral abstention..." Right: "Your mayor — do you know who elected him? 8 % of the city's residents. The other 92 % didn't come. And this mayor spends YOUR taxes. $800 million a year. You pay. He spends. You didn't decide. Fair?"
Rule 2: One sentence, then keep silent. Wrong: 47 words in one sentence with a formula and the SSA. Right: "Before the election — two buttons. I VOTE — my vote weighs triple. I TAKE $780 — I leave honestly." 19 words. Clear. Memorable. Then KEEP SILENT. Let the person ask. If he asked = interested. If not = don't push.
Rule 3: Examples, not theory. Wrong: "Revealed preference replaces stated preference in electoral behaviour..." Right: "A mum from the projects earns $22K. She's offered $780. She says: NO. Because her child's school is closing. She goes to vote. For the school. And a hedge-fund manager on $350K takes the $780. Because he doesn't care which school. Who should decide about the school?"
Rule 4: Don't say "AB-EXIT" — say "$780 or the vote". AB-EXIT sounds like an antivirus or a CIA operation. "$780 or the vote" = everyone understands. Three words. The name — only once the person is interested.
Rule 5: Don't mention the formula, CLR, SSA, VRA. The formula = for lawyers. CLR = for academics. For an ordinary person: "The sum is calculated from the average wage in the city. The richer the city — the more you get. No mayor can change this sum. It's automatic."
Rule 6: One argument, not ten. Not Condorcet + Nash + Socrates + $26B + the Say-Do Gap all at once. One: "48 % don't vote. For free. Why is free = normal, but for $780 = a crime?" One phrase. One question. If the person cannot answer — he has started thinking. Thinking = victory.
28.3. The right order of the conversation¶
Step 1 — THE PAIN (10 seconds): "Do you know who elected your mayor? 8 % of the city." Any reaction = he is listening.
Step 2 — THE OFFER (10 seconds): "What if before the election — two buttons: I vote (vote ×3) or I take $780 and leave?" Reaction: "How's that?!"
Step 3 — KEEP SILENT. Let him think. Let him ask. He will ask one of two things: "And who pays?" → "The city. From the budget. 2 %." Or: "And is it legal?" → "A Supreme Court lawyer has already written an analysis. Yes."
Step 4 — THE TRAP QUESTION: "And what would you choose — $780 or the vote?" This is a personal question that makes him think. Not "what do you think of AB-EXIT" (abstract) but "YOU personally" (concrete).
Step 5 — LISTEN. Whatever he answers = he is thinking about AB-EXIT = victory.
28.4. Six versions of the pitch for different audiences¶
For a working man: "You pay taxes. The mayor spends them. You didn't elect him — 8 % of the city elected him. Want those who care to choose? $780 to those who don't care — let them leave. And you decide. With a triple vote."
For a mum: "Your child's school is decided by the mayor. The mayor was chosen by people who don't care about the school. What if those who don't care get $780 and leave? And you stay and choose a mayor who cares too."
For a young person: "You'll live under this mayor for 40 years. A pensioner — 3 years. Right now the pensioner decides. What if the pensioner takes $780 for medication and you decide what city you'll live in?"
For a pensioner: "$780 to your account. For not knowing whom to vote for anyway. Or: vote — and your vote weighs triple. Either way you get something. Now you get zero."
For a businessman: "The mayor spends $800M of your taxes. He was elected by 8 % of the city. Half of them don't know what a budget is. What if only those who understand decided?"
For a sceptic: "48 % don't vote. For free. Every election. Explain: why is not voting for free = normal, but for $780 = a crime? If you can — $10,000 is yours. Four AIs couldn't."
28.5. The main mistake: the creator's language vs the user's language¶
Apple never says: "The A17 Pro chip with a 6-core CPU and a 16-core Neural Engine at 17 TOPS per watt." Apple says: "The most powerful iPhone." Three words.
AB-EXIT for ordinary people: "$780 or the vote." Three words.
The creator says: "A protocol of compensated electoral abstention with a formula tied to SSA data via the W-2 median..." The user hears: "Blah blah blah formula blah SSA blah..." = nonsense.
The user wants to hear: "$780 or the vote. You choose. Every election." Everything else — after he has asked.
29.1. Five kinds of herd voting¶
25 % of the electorate are neither apathetics (who don't care) nor the convinced (who have a position). They are the DOUBTERS: people who think but are not sure, and in the end vote with the crowd. Five mechanisms:
Social pressure. "All my friends are for A. If I say otherwise — they'll judge me. Easier to agree." Votes like his surroundings, not as he thinks.
Polls as a command. "Poll: A = 55 %. The majority can't be wrong." The poll CREATES the result it predicts — a self-fulfilling prophecy. A gets not 55 % but 60 %, because the doubters joined the 55 %.
The media cascade. "CNN/Fox all day about A. So A = important = right." Whoever is more in the media = whoever wins. Not whoever is better.
The spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). "I'm for B. But everyone around is for A. If I say so — they'll isolate me. I keep silent." The minority keeps silent → the majority seems even bigger → even more silence → B loses although 45 % are secretly for B.
The information cascade (Banerjee, 1992). Person 1 chooses A (at random). Person 2 sees "1 is for A" → chooses A. Person 1,000 sees "999 are for A" → OBVIOUSLY A. Even if A = bad. One random choice → 1,000 identical ones. The cascade is self-reinforcing.
Asch's study (1951): 75 % of people at least once agreed with the crowd's obviously wrong answer. $8.5B of TV advertising = the creation of an ILLUSION OF A CROWD: "everyone's for A, join in!" Elections are decided not by the best candidate — elections are decided by the best imitation of a crowd.
29.2. The price of a vote = the antidote to the crowd¶
The key mechanism: a free vote is easy to give to the crowd ("I don't care, I'll go with everyone"). A vote worth $780 — no ("I paid $780, I won't give it to the crowd, I'll decide myself").
The formula for the strength of the crowd effect: (number of the uncritical) × (homogeneity of information) × (social pressure) ÷ (price of the vote). Now: 175,000 uncritical × 100 % TV × high pressure ÷ $0 = infinity. The crowd is omnipotent. With AB-EXIT: 5,000 uncritical × 20 % TV × low pressure ÷ $780 = 0.013. The crowd is powerless.
Division by $780 = the key factor. When the vote is free, it is easy to sacrifice for conformity. When the vote costs $780, every decision weighs. Price = a vaccine against herd thinking.
29.3. The transformation: crowd → discussion¶
| Parameter | Now (crowd) | With AB-EXIT (discussion) |
|---|---|---|
| Size | 235,000 = a CROWD | 47,000 = a GROUP |
| Behaviour | Herd: "everyone's for A!" | Discursive: "I'm for A because..." |
| Information | Homogeneous (all from TV) | Heterogeneous (each has studied) |
| Pressure | "Don't be the odd one out!" | "I respect your choice" |
| Polls | CREATE the result | DON'T INFLUENCE ($780 > a poll) |
| Spiral | Of silence (afraid to speak) | Of conversation (everyone speaks) |
| Cascade | Self-reinforcing (they copy) | Broken (they compare) |
| Decision | By emotion: "everyone's running, so am I!" | By analysis: "my $780 = my choice" |
The cascade is broken at the first step: person 2 = motivated = does not copy but compares. A cascade needs uncritical followers. AB-EXIT removed the uncritical. The critical remain. The critical do not cascade.
The spiral of silence is killed: the motivated = confident; the confident = not afraid of others' opinion; not afraid = do not pressure dissenters; no pressure = no need for silence; everyone speaks. A spiral of conversation instead of a spiral of silence.
29.4. The evolution of the doubter over cycles¶
Cycle 1: the doubter stayed (did not take $780). For the first time in a discussion rather than a crowd. "I have to decide myself? No crowd? OK... I'm reading the programme. For the first time." An uncertain vote, but his own.
Cycle 2: the former doubter has gained experience. "I voted for A. The dividend grew! My choice = right!" Or: "The dividend fell. My choice was wrong. I'll study more carefully." Feedback through the dividend. The doubter LEARNS.
Cycle 3: the former doubter = an analyst. Reads the budget. Compares programmes. Explains to others. The crowd effect is impossible in a group of analysts with 12 years of experience.
Cycle 5: the electorate = 100 % experienced voters. Each = 20 years of his own experience. Each knows how the dividend correlates with the mayor's quality. None yields to the crowd. Experience > the crowd. Always. AB-EXIT is not a one-off filter but a LEARNING MACHINE: every cycle turns doubters into analysts, shudras into vaishyas, followers into thinkers.
30.1. The spiral of lies: the system rewards deception¶
Candidate A (honest): "Fixing the roads = $12M. Source: property tax +0.3 %." True but unpopular. Candidate B (a deceiver): "I'll fix the roads! I'll cut taxes! All for free!" A lie but popular. 12,000 informed see that B is lying — vote for A. 55,000 manipulable don't check — vote for B. 48,000 habitual — for their letter. B wins. The deceiver beat the honest man. Not by chance — SYSTEMICALLY.
The conclusion for the next candidates: honesty = a losing strategy, deception = a winning one. Every cycle = more lies, more promises. Cycle 1: promises $10M. Cycle 3: promises $200M. Cycle 5: the city is bankrupt (Stockton 2012: $900M). And good people do not go into politics: "To win you have to deceive. I don't want to. So I don't go." Gresham's law for politics: bad candidates drive out good ones.
30.2. The spiral of extinction: falling turnout strengthens the machine¶
A bad mayor → disappointment → falling turnout. 2,000 machine votes of 50,000 = 4 %. Of 20,000 = 10 %. Of 10,000 = 20 %. The lower the turnout = the stronger the machine. A bad mayor → disappointment → falling turnout → a stronger machine → an even worse mayor → even lower turnout → the city is dead. Both spirals mutually reinforce each other = a funnel with no way out. Stockton ($900M), Detroit (1.8M→630K), Baltimore (50 years of degradation).
30.3. The chain of dependence on power¶
The deceiver-mayor distributes jobs ($40K), contracts ($500K–$5M), subsidies, permits. The recipients = dependent. A municipal worker: "The mayor gave me a job. A new mayor will fire me. I vote for the mayor. Even if he steals. A job > principles." A contractor: "The mayor gave me a $2M contract. I vote for the mayor. I bring 200 workers. I keep quiet about the corruption. $2M > principles." A Ponzi pyramid for votes: every cycle = more dependents = a stronger machine = competition ever more impossible. Cycle 4: 1 candidate with no alternative. Elections without a choice.
30.4. Seven scholars who proved each piece of the spiral¶
Caselli & Morelli (2004), "Bad Politicians", Journal of Public Economics. Proved: highly qualified citizens do not go into politics because of the opportunity cost (an engineer at $150K → a mayor at $95K = a $55K loss). Mathematically: the higher the qualification = the smaller the incentive. AB-EXIT changes the equation: governing 47,000 motivated people who value competence = a benefit. Engineering skills = a competitive advantage. Negative selection is inverted. Predicted reaction: 80 % positive, want empirical testing.
Bryan Caplan (2007), "The Myth of the Rational Voter", Princeton University Press. Proved: voters are not merely ignorant but systematically biased. "Rational irrationality": irrational beliefs are free (1 vote of millions = zero influence; why be rational?). AB-EXIT raises the price of irrationality to $780. Irrationality is inversely proportional to its price. At $0 = maximum. At $780 = minimum. AB-EXIT = the first mechanism for raising the price of irrational voting. A market mechanism inside democracy. Prediction: 90 % positive, will call it "the solution to my problem".
Jason Brennan (2016), "Against Democracy", Princeton University Press. Proposed epistocracy (rule of the knowing) through an exam for voters. The problem: who writes the exam? Racial bias? Jim Crow analogies? AB-EXIT = epistocracy without an exam. Self-selection through the wallet: the hobbits and hooligans take $780, the Vulcans stay. The same result, a more elegant mechanism. No exam = no bias. $780 is the same for everyone. Prediction: 95 % positive, will call it "market epistocracy".
Anthony Downs (1957), "An Economic Theory of Democracy". Proved: rational ignorance — a rational voter does not study politics because 1 vote of millions = probability of influencing ≈ 0. AB-EXIT: 1 of 47,000 = ×5 returns + $780 at stake. At a high enough price of the vote and a small electorate = it is rational to become informed. Rational ignorance → rational KNOWLEDGE. Prediction: 85 % positive, "inverted my theorem by my method".
Achen & Bartels (2016), "Democracy for Realists", Princeton University Press. Proved: voters choose by group identity, not by results. Retrospective voting (punish a bad mayor) does not work — voters punish for the weather, drought, even a shark attack (New Jersey 1916). The reason: no metric. AB-EXIT creates a metric: the dividend. One number in the bank account. $780→$810 = good. $780→$720 = bad. For the first time retrospective voting can work. Prediction: 75 % positive, see the dividend as an accountability metric.
Dal Bó, Dal Bó & Di Tella (2006), "Plata o Plomo? Bribe and Punishment". Proved: bad politicians stay through bribes (plata) and threats (plomo). AB-EXIT inverts it: state plata ($780 to the account) > the mafia's ($50 in an envelope). Plomo is inverted: now a bad politician threatens a good one; with AB-EXIT 46,000 motivated threaten the bad one. Prediction: 80 % positive.
Messner & Polborn (2004), "Paying Politicians", Journal of Public Economics. Proved: politicians' pay affects the quality of entrants. Too low = the untalented come. BUT the key: a poor electorate BLOCKS a rise in the mayor's pay. The poor man counts emotionally: "He gets 3 times more than me — unfair!" The rational one counts: $0.33 from each → a good mayor → savings of $2,812 for each, ROI 852,121 %. But 55 % poor > 12 % rational = envy wins = $95K = the untalented. AB-EXIT: the motivated rationally raise the pay to $200K. A competent CEO comes. And that is only the beginning: the motivated unblock ALL the decisions the poor blocked for decades — infrastructure bonds (NPV > cost), police pension reform (90 %→50 %), STEM programmes (ROI 128,000 %), attracting business (100 jobs × $50K > an $800K tax holiday). Each: the poor = "no, too expensive!" The motivated = "ROI positive, yes." Prediction: 70 % positive, want to extend the model.
30.5. AB-EXIT breaks both spirals at once¶
The spiral of lies is broken: the manipulable left for $780; the motivated check. "You'll fix the roads for free? Show the calculation. A $4M deficit, from where? Lying? Next." Lies do not work on the motivated. Because their vote cost $780 — they will not give it to a deceiver.
The spiral of extinction is broken: a bad mayor → the dividend falls → not disappointment but ANGER → not departure but replacing the mayor → a better mayor → the dividend grows. A reverse spiral upward instead of a funnel downward.
30.6. The quality spiral: Gresham's law inverted¶
Instead of two spirals down — one spiral up. The motivated raise the mayor's pay ($0.33/resident) → the competent come → the honest one wins (the motivated check) → the city prospers → the dividend grows → new candidates see: honesty = a winning strategy → even better candidates → competition of programmes rather than promises → politics = a competition of competences.
Gresham's law in politics (now): bad candidates drive out good ones (the system rewards deception). Anti-Gresham under AB-EXIT: good candidates drive out bad ones (the system rewards honesty). For the first time in the history of politics. Seven problems proved by seven scholars over 50 years — one formula, three symbols, one reversal: D = M × 1.5 × 1 %.