AB-EXIT Referendum Lab · Step 1

One payment. Two referenda.

Set the shared election-cycle payment and economic context. Every later module inherits this payment. Here, AB-EXIT is compared with a one-time universal payment of the same face value.

$2,000
$90,000
Typical household—two potential recipients
Share of monthly income—one-time household payment
Expected weight of an A vote—— choose B

New election mechanism

AB-EXIT

—
Yes—
No—
Did not vote—
Turnout—
Fiscal exposure—

The dark lower section of each bar is the producing core.

Control: same payment per person

One-time payment to everyone

—
Yes—
No—
Did not vote—
Turnout—
Fiscal exposure—

The dark lower section of each bar is the producing core.

Continue only if AB-EXIT is adopted

The remaining tests examine what happens after adoption. If the referendum rejects AB-EXIT, the rules do not change—and there is no AB-EXIT scenario to continue.

Continue the adopted scenario →
What is arithmetic, and what is a hypothesis?

Arithmetic: every group sums to 10,000; AB-EXIT pays only expected B participants; the A-vote weight is the total electorate divided by remaining candidate voters.

Hypothesis: turnout, support, A/B choice, and producing-core responses come from a versioned synthetic profile and require field calibration. Acceptance is not hard-coded: within the controls above, the model can return PASSED, REJECTED, or NO QUORUM.